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I. Introduction
The foundation of civil liberty in
modern democratic societies is the due process of law, the guarantee that no person shall
be deprived of his or her freedom without a
just cause, nor receive any punishment not
duly and legally prescribed, nor suffer any
punishment that would be inhumane or destructive of dignity. In the United States
equal justice for all people before the law,
during times of peace and war, is enshrined
not only in the Constitution but also in the
international laws that bind us and connect
us with the rest of the world. The promise
of fair and equal justice is one of the principles our country was founded upon and an
ideal that should earn us the respect and admiration of the world.
It is, however, an
ideal, one that Americans and citizens of
other free nations have done too little to
make an everyday reality. Arbitrary arrests,
unfair trials, torture and degrading treatment
are not remnants of the distant past, and neither are they the sole province of oppressed
countries controlled by strongman dictators.
For democratic societies they are not entirely
new, either. In the United States, for example, the use of torture in correctional facilities and by police officers throughout the
country has not been uncommon in the last
several decades (Conroy 33). The torture of
captured enemies during wartime by American soldiers occurred as well, during the
Vietnam War (Greer 372).
These violations, however shameful,
do not approach the scope or scale of the
most recent assault against the principle of
due process in the United States. Beginning
during the immediate the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001,
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and ending only with its departure
from power in January 2009, the
administration of President George
W. Bush placed suspected terrorists under arrest for indefinite periods of time
in a manner contrary to the laws of war,
denied those prisoners fair trials, authorized
the use interrogation techniques, such as
stress positions and simulated drowning
(also called “waterboarding”) that are torturous or degrading to human dignity, and sent
suspected terrorists overseas for the purpose
of interrogations where torture had a high
likelihood of occurring (the so-called
“extraordinary renditions”). The Bush administration asserted that these acts are legally justified by presidential military authority and beyond the ability of any law to
prevent (Greer 384). One effect of these actions was to reduce the importance of obeying international law and respecting the humanity of prisoners in the minds of American personnel, leading to situations where
abusive behavior went beyond the original
intent of the administration, such as the infamous abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib
Prison in Iraq by American military police
(Gourevitch 103).
It is tempting, in times of great national crisis, to act with less restraint than
the principles of justice would otherwise allow. Let it not be said that Al Qaeda is not a
serious threat, because it does pose a grave
danger, and in a way that the United States is
not used to fighting against. It is true that
international terrorist networks cannot be
defeated with conventional military doctrine,
but that doesn’t mean that Americans have
to abandon these principles, especially not
for the sake of measures which may seem
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very effective and “tough” but are actually
counterproductive.
The closest historical
analog to the behavior of the Bush administration towards prisoners is the internment
of Japanese-American citizens during the
Second World War, supposedly to prevent
sabotage, a decision which was ordered by
President Roosevelt and backed by the Supreme Court. It is well-known today that the
danger of sabotage was very small and the
internment is considered one of the great
shames of the United States’ history. The
mistreatment of detainees and disregard for
international law over the past several years
has not only been unnecessary but may have
actually strengthened our enemies, and there
is little doubt that the attempts to institutionalize and legally justify the use of torture
will also go down as one of the most shameful parts of American history.
Other countries that have tried to circumvent the rule of law during times of war
or national crisis have suffered for it. The
experimental tactics used by the United
Kingdom against Irish Catholics only exacerbated the threat of the Irish Republican
Army and left a black mark on British history. The Israeli government’s attempts to
institute legal coercive interrogations in a
limited manner led to a spiraling pattern of
systemic abuse. Both cases illuminate different ways that ignoring international law
can and has harmed the interests of the
United States.
The indefinite detention of so-called
“unlawful enemy combatants,” denying such
persons access to impartial courts when they
are in custody, and the use of certain interrogation techniques amounting to torture and
degrading treatment are all violations of
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multiple instruments of international law. They have also hurt the
interests of the United States by damaging its reputation and moral authority
abroad and encouraging ordinary people
of foreign nations to take up arms against
us. It will benefit the United States to observe international law in all future endeavors.
II. Overview of International Law
Regarding Prisoners
1.Introduction
International law comes in many
forms; unlike municipal (i.e., domestic) law,
there is not an orderly hierarchy of official
law-making bodies in international politics,
and for that reason international law arises
from the consensus of states. Treaties are
written agreements among two or more
states, and in modern times they are probably the most important type of international
law (Shaw 89).1 A large number of treaties
that regulate state behavior towards prisoners are binding on the United States, many
of which reflect broader principles and ideals. For that reason, it will be sufficient to
focus on treaties in an analysis of what international laws regulate how the United States
must treat detainees in the war on terror.
There are two major types of international law that affect how states must treat
those in their power: humanitarian law and
human rights law. International humanitarian law, more formally known as jus in
bello, regulates state practice in times of
war; it prescribes how states must treat prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territories, among other things (Shaw 1055).
International human rights law regulates the
way states treat people in their power in gen-
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eral; in many cases such law explicitly forbids the derogation of certain rights even
during wars or emergencies (256). Treaties
representing both types of law are binding
on the United States and thus are relevant to
its conduct in the war against terrorism.
2. Categories of protected persons
The Four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and their Additional Protocols are the
core of international humanitarian law, and
are universally recognized as law (ICRC).
They prescribe legal protections for any
imaginable class of person who may come
under the control of a belligerent power in
the course of an armed conflict. The Third
1949 Geneva Convention (hereafter GC III)
protects prisoners of war. Its provisions apply during any period of international armed
conflict, regardless of the existence of an
official declaration of war or recognition of
a state of war by any party to the fighting.
GC III defines “prisoners of war” to include
regular soldiers of a party to the conflict,
duly authorized civilian crews, laborers, correspondents, and mechanics that accompany
military units, and members of the merchant
marine. Also included are members of militias or resistance movements that follow certain rules: having a clear command structure;
wearing a distinctive mark that can be distinguished from a distance; carrying arms
openly; and obeying the laws and customs of
warfare. Also included are soldiers of a government not recognized by a Detaining
Power, which don’t necessarily need to meet
all the same conditions as militias to qualify
for POW treatment. Furthermore, belligerent captives whose status under GC III are in
doubt must be treated as if they qualify as
prisoners of war until a “competent
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tribunal” can determine otherwise.
The Fourth Geneva Convention (hereafter GC IV) protects civilians not otherwise protected by the
other three conventions and who are in
the power of a foreign state during a war
or occupation, if they are nationals of a
state belligerent to the conflict. Persons that
participate in a conflict without qualifying
for protection under GC III would, if they
are nationals of a state party to the conflict,
be entitled to the protections of GC IV
(Dormann 50). The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (hereafter AP
I) provides additional rules for the conduct
of international conflicts. It has not been
ratified by the United States, but some of its
provisions, notably Article 75, are commonly regarded as reflecting customary international law and are thus binding regardless (Sands 150). Article 75 describes
“Fundamental Guarantees,” the basic rights
accorded to anyone in the power of state
party to a conflict who is not otherwise protected by another provision of AP I or any of
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Civilian
nationals of a state that is not a party to a
given conflict, for example, would not qualify for protected person status under the
Conventions and would therefore fall under
Article 75’s protection. Article 75 (or more
precisely the customary law it reflects, in the
case of the United States) thus makes it impossible for anyone to be in the power of a
state without having some guarantee of protection under international humanitarian law
(Dormann 73).
In the early days of the United Nations two legal instruments were created
which were vital to the later development of
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major human rights treaties. The first is the
UN Charter itself, which states that the UN
should support universal observance of human rights in Article 55. The second is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948, which proclaimed a universal standard
of rights that should be observed and protected. At the time these were not enforceable in any meaningful way, although they
may have become binding to an extent since.
Their chief importance lies in the road they
paved toward more concrete legal instruments later on (Shaw 261).
The major human rights treaties
which regulate state behavior towards detainees are the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR)
and the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, both of which the United States has
ratified (OHCR). According to General
Comment 31 of the Human Rights Committee, states parties to the ICCPR have an obligation to ensure the rights of all people in
their jurisdiction or effective control, even if
they are outside said state’s territory. Article
5 of the Torture Convention likewise enjoins
all state parties to outlaw torture in any territories under their jurisdiction.
3. General rights and treatment
Part II of GC III describes in general terms the rights of POWs, in that they
are to be treated humanely, given appropriate medical care, and treated without undue
discrimination. Part III, which includes Articles 17-107, describes POW rights in
greater detail. Prisoners of war are only required to provide accurate information about
their identities, including, name, rank, and
social security number or equivalent. Their
quarters must be as good as those of
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soldiers of the Detaining Power in
the same area, particularly regarding
space and bedding allowed, and must
not be deleterious to the health of prisoners, and are not to be located in a
place that is especially close to combat
zones. Food and water must be provided
sufficiently to keep the prisoners healthy and
prevent weight loss, and clothing suitable for
the local climate must be given to the prisoners and repaired or replaced as is necessary.
Camps must be clean and sanitary, and have
necessary facilities for the medical treatment
and monthly inspection of prisoners. All
prisoners must be allowed to practice their
religion, and if there is no clerical official to
provide appropriate services among the prisoners then one must be provided by the Detaining Power. Discrimination based on
race, religion, nationality, or language is
prohibited. Prisoners must be able to write
letters to their families informing them of
their situations whenever they are captured,
transferred to another camp, or hospitalized,
and they must be allowed to receive letters
and send at least two letters of their own per
month, barring difficulties in procuring
translators and censors.
GC IV allows for the internment of
persons protected by its provisions only if
necessary to military security, and guarantees internees largely the same set of rights
that prisoners of war have under GC III. It
states in Article 5 that, unlike GC III, a protected person engaged in or definitely suspected of hostile activities may be detained
without being entitled to certain rights otherwise guaranteed if they would be harmful to
the security of the occupying power, such as
the right to communication, although full
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protection must be restored as soon as possible.
Part III of the ICCPR, covering Articles 6-27, guarantees the right to life, protection against degrading treatment, discrimination, and slavery, the right to freedom and
practice of religion, the right to recognition
as a person under the law, and the right human treatment and respect for their dignity
to everyone under the jurisdiction of a state
party to the Convention. According to Article 4 certain derogations may be made from
the Convention only if required by an emergency situation; Article 4 also states that
such derogations can not be applied toward
the rights to freedom from torture and discrimination, or the right to free exercise of
religion.
4. Fair trial rights
GC III provides that prisoners of war
who are accused of crimes must have fair
trials in regularly constituted, independent,
and impartial courts, by the same procedures
under which soldiers of the detaining power
would be tried. Proceedings must be held as
quickly as possible, and if it is necessary to
confine a prisoner before said proceedings
such confinement must last no longer than
three months. POWs on trial have the right
to a qualified advocate, meet said advocate
in private, call witnesses in their defense,
and appeal decisions. POWs convicted of
crimes must have their sentences served in
the same facilities and in the same manner as
soldiers of the Detaining Power in equivalent situations. Persons who are protected
by GC IV have largely the same trial rights
as prisoners of war, and if convicted should
be kept separate from other detainees. Article 75 of AP I prohibits any sentence or
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punishment from being carried out
“except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the
generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure…”
Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits
arbitrary detention, mandates that anyone
charged with a crime be “entitled to a trial
within a reasonable time…,” and states that
anyone under arrest has the right to have a
court review the lawfulness of the arrest and
order him freed if it is illegal. Article 14
guarantees the rights of all persons facing
criminal charges to a legally established, independent, impartial court, to be presumed
innocent before being found guilty, to summon witnesses in his defense, and to examine witnesses against him.
5. Prohibitions against torture and other
degrading treatment
GC III prohibits the use of torture as
an interrogation method in Article 17 and as
a method of punishment in Article 87, and in
Article 130 lists torture as a “grave breach”
of the Conventions requiring state parties to
find and bring to trial anyone accused of
committing it. Article 32 of GC IV prohibits
causing physical suffering of protected persons, including torture, and like GC III lists
torture as a “grave breach” in Article 147.
Article 75 of AP I prohibits torture and degrading treatment under any circumstances
whatsoever. Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and degrading treatment, and Article 4 lists this as a right that may not be
derogated in a time of national crisis or
emergency.
The Convention against Torture, as
might be expected, goes into much greater

SUNY Geneseo

depth on this issue than other relevant treaties. It defines torture in Article 1 as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an
official capacity.
Article 2 requires state parties to
take effective measures to ban torture and
states that nothing whatsoever, even a public
emergency, can justify torture. Article 3
bans sending a person to another country
where there is a real danger of that person
being tortured. Article 5 declares that the
illegality of torture must extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of the state parties
or onboard ships and aircraft registered to
the state parties. Article 10 states that anyone involved in the treatment of detainees
should be educated on the prohibition of torture, and Article 11 requires state parties to
review rules and practices of detention and
interrogation with an eye toward preventing
torture. Article 16 additionally requires state
parties to prevent “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not amount to torture as defined in
article 1” from being committed by public
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officials in territories under their
jurisdiction.
6. Execution and enforcement
a. The Red Cross
The International Committee of
the Red Cross (hereafter ICRC or Red
Cross) is an international non-governmental
organization that has provided assistance to
prisoners and the wounded in times of war
for since the mid-nineteenth century. It has
been closely involved with the creation, implementation, execution, and enforcement of
most instruments of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their predecessors (Shaw 1163).
International law provides the
ICRC a special legal mandate to perform
humanitarian functions during times of international armed conflict. GC III guarantees
the ability of the ICRC to act as a neutral
protecting power during a conflict; this entails the authority to ensure the shipments of
mail and relief to and from places of internment, receive reports about the labor conditions of prisoners, and propose the creation
of a Central POW Information Agency,
among others. Article 125 of GC III commits state parties to assist charitable organizations, especially the ICRC, deliver relief to
POWs. Article 126 states that ICRC delegates must have the ability to visit any place
where prisoners of war are held, employed,
or transported without restriction and to hold
interviews with prisoners in private. These
liberties are not contingent on the ICRC being recognized as a protecting power by the
detaining power in question. GC IV provides similar powers to the Red Cross regarding inspections, relief, and insurance of
shipments to and from places where persons
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under its protection are detained.
Unfortunately, the ICRC is limited
in its ability to publicly protest against violations that it observes because of its traditional stance on confidentiality. It maintains
neutrality in order to more fully guarantee its
access to prisoners, refugees, and other persons that may require its help, so the ICRC
has very rarely made public its knowledge of
transgressions against international humanitarian law (Shaw 1079).
b. Prescriptions for domestic enforcement
The Geneva Conventions also place
certain responsibilities on state parties with
respect to their enforcement. Both GC III
and IV require the dissemination of the text
of the conventions in both peace and war, as
well as the inclusion of their study in
courses of military and civil instruction.
Personnel that have responsibility for protected persons must have access to copies of
the conventions at all times and receive special instruction as to their provisions. State
parties are also required to provide effective
legal sanctions against committing grave
breaches,2 bring any person accused of a
grave breach to trial regardless of nationality,3 and to otherwise suppress all acts contrary to the Conventions that are not grave
breaches.
The ICCPR requires state parties to
protect each right guaranteed by its provisions by the force of domestic law. Articles
4 and 5 of the Convention against Torture
require state parties make torture illegal under domestic law and do whatever is necessary to establish jurisdiction over torture in
any territory under is control. Articles 6 and
7 mandate that states parties must arrest any
person alleged to have violated the
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convention and either extradite that
person or put the case to its own authorities for the purpose of prosecution.4
c. Treaty mechanisms
Since there was no pre-existing
organization like the ICRC to manage issues of human rights law, the ICCPR and the
Torture Convention both set up special committees with enforcement duties. Part IV of
the ICCPR, comprising Articles 28-45, mandates the creation of a Human Rights Committee, whose members are elected by and
from the states parties to the Covenant.
State Parties are required to submit reports
on their efforts to guarantee the rights listed
in the CCPR one year after it enters into
force, and the Committee has the power to
request further reports at any time afterwards. The Committee may also receive
complaints from one state party about another’s alleged failure to fulfill its obligations under the CCPR and attempt to solve
any such dispute by mediating negotiations
between the parties involved if it decides
that all domestic remedies have been exhausted or unreasonably delayed.5 In cases
where the Committee is unable to resolve
and issue it may appoint an ad hoc Commission to further attempt to create an amicable
solution. The Committee also has the responsibility to submit an annual report of its
activities to the General Assembly of the
United Nations. The Committee can issue
General Comments that explain and interpret
the Covenant’s provisions; General Comment 31, mentioned above, is an example of
such a comment.
Article 17 of the Convention against
Torture prescribes the creation of the Com-
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mittee against Torture, a body consciously
modeled on the Human Rights Committee of
the ICCPR (Nowak 586). State parties must
submit reports to this Committee not just
one year after the Convention enters into
force for them but every four years thereafter as well, in addition to whatever other reports the Committee requests. In cases
where well-founded evidence indicates the
possibility of torture being carried the Committee can invite the state party concerned to
cooperate in examining the evidence and
making observations based upon it. If it is
warranted, the Committee may also make a
confidential inquiry into the matter, which
may involve visiting the territory of the state
party in question. It has similar powers to
the Human Rights Committee regarding the
power to mediate disputes between state parties if domestic remedies have been exhausted, and it may also receive communications from individuals claiming to be victims
of violations of the Convention if a state
party with jurisdiction over said individuals
recognizes the competence of the Committee
to do so.
d. UN organizations
There are also other organizations
that are outside of the specific framework of
the relevant treaties, which are important to
monitoring and investigating the way prisoners and detainees are treated throughout the
world, including official bodies of the
United Nations. One such organization is
the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (hereafter OHCHR), which is
the primary executive body of the United
Nations responsible for human rights. It coordinates and organizes the efforts of all the
UN groups with some responsibility for
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human rights (Forsythe 4).
The Human Rights Council,
a subsidiary body of the United Nations
General Assembly, was created in 2006
in order to more effectively address human rights violations throughout the world.
It took over the task from its predecessor,
the Human Rights Commission, which came
under intense criticism for the poor human
rights record of some of its members. The
institution of the Council, a body with largely
similar powers, intended to ameliorate that
problem by having its members elected by the
General Assembly (76). It is tasked with performing “Universal Periodic Review,” a process that entails the cooperative examination of
human rights situations in all member states of
the United Nations. The Council may also
receive and discuss credible communications
regarding “consistent patterns of gross and
reliably attested violations of all human rights
and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any
part of the world and under any circumstances,” if domestic remedies have been exhausted. The Human Rights Council also has
the power, inherited from the Commission, to
establish “special procedures,” which are mandates that empower their holders (who are usually expert individuals) to investigate, advise,
and make public reports on specific areas of
their expertise. Such mandates may be assigned either to specific countries or to thematic issues relating to human rights (Shaw
283).
There is such a mandate regarding torture; the title of the person holding that mandate is “Special Rapporteur on torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” According to the official web
page on the OHCHR’s web site, the Special
Rapporteur has the responsibility to transmit
appeals and other communications regarding
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torture to state governments, perform factfinding missions, and make annual reports to
the Council and the UN General Assembly.
He or she can act with far more independence
than most other legally established human
rights entities, including the Human Rights
Council itself, because he or she is not bound
by the constraints of the usual exhaustion of
domestic remedies rule (Weissbrodt 693). 6
e. NGOs
There are, of course, many important
organizations dedicated to protecting human
rights and investigating breaches of international law that are not affiliated with the
United Nations or any government at all. Two
of the most important non-governmental organizations (or NGOs) that concern themselves with the treatment of prisoners and detainees are Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International.
Human Rights Watch has a relatively
small membership, made up of about 230 experienced and influential professionals. It
works to promote human rights by conducting
investigations into alleged abuses of all sorts
throughout the world, publishing their findings
publicly (unlike the Red Cross) in order to
shame and embarrass abusers through media
attention, and encouraging them to make reforms (Korey 309). Through its fact-finding
and lobbying it also seeks to influence governments and international organizations throughout the world, especially the United States
government (344).
Amnesty International, by contrast, is
a mass-movement organization that draws its
influence from large grassroots membership.
Amnesty International performs many activities draws its influence from large grassroots
membership. Amnesty International performs
many activities
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similar to those of Human Rights
Watch, such as fact-finding, observation, appealing to governments and reporting its findings publicly and widely;
it also mobilizes its large numbers for
other tasks, such as large-scale demonstrations, petitions, letter-writing campaigns,
and protests against policies that infringe on
human rights (Clark 9). Amnesty International focuses special attention on prisoners
that have been illegally detained or abused
while in custody, although it deals with other
human rights issues as well (12).
f. Legal prosecutions and punishments All of
the aforementioned executive bodies, committees, and NGOs perform vital tasks such as
fact-finding, publishing, and engaging with
abusive actors to change their policies. Let it
not be said that what they do is unimportant;
their operations are necessary to uncovering
and preventing illegal abuses of detainees.
None of them, however, have the responsibility or the power to enforce international law
the way “enforcement” is commonly thought
of in domestic law: arresting, charging, trying,
and punishing individuals that make transgressions against the law. Historically, that task
has fallen, for better or for worse, to state governments.
If an individual commits or orders to
be committed an act of abuse against a prisoner of war, then obviously the government of
the state to which he is a national has the right
and duty to put that individual on trial for the
crime. If the abuse is ordered or condoned at
the highest levels of government then, of
course, there is little chance of such a prosecution actually taking place. There is no universally applicable system of sanction and punishment in international law as exists in domestic law (Shaw 4). Therefore, in such situations the responsibility for capturing and
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prosecuting alleged abusers has usually fallen
to some other state or group of states, according either to the principle of prosecuting offenses committed against themselves or the
principle of universal jurisdiction.
Two of the most important examples
of the former principle at work are the Tokyo
and Nuremberg trials of German and Japanese
leaders and soldiers after the Second World
War.7 That a state has a legitimate right to
prosecute those who are alleged to have committed war crimes against them or their nationals, so long as fair trial standards are applied,
is a longstanding principle of international law
appealed to by the Allies to justify the trials.
The “victors’ justice” challenge, the assertion
that a court is illegitimate because it has been
created by the winners of a war to judge the
defeated, was presented by the defendants at
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other ad hoc international courts throughout history, but never
with any success (Boister 32). The claim that
the Allies were legally unable to combine their
jurisdiction and form a single court, which was
presented by the defendants at the beginning
of the Tokyo trials, was unanimously dismissed out of hand by the court (178).
State governments clearly have a legal
right to prosecute alleged war criminals, including POW abusers,8 and may combine their
jurisdictions into a single court. These rights
were exercised in the post-World War II trials.
The manner in which those rights were used,
however, left much to be desired regarding
fairness. The trials were conducted as military
tribunals, even if they were of an international
character, and therefore would probably not
pass the requirements for a fair and independent court required by the ICCPR and the Geneva Conventions. The charters which established the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
allowed them to ignore “technical rules of
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evidence” and admit anything they
deemed to have relevance to the
case in Articles 19 and 13, respectively.9 The Tokyo Tribunal in particular suffered from a host of problems,
including inter alia political and ethnic
bias on the part of the judges, the disproportionately high rejection rate of the defense’s evidence, the abnormal length of the
trial, and the relative lack of time and resources available to the defense. It did not
come close to meeting fair trial standards,
even at the time when it took place (Boister
89-114). Regardless of the importance of
these trials to the development of modern
international law, as a model for carrying out
that law today they are sorely lacking.
The latter half of the twentieth century has seen the increasing adoption of the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction, which
holds that certain crimes are so heinous that
any court may charge, try and convict an
offender regardless of the territorial limits of
its jurisdiction. War crimes, including grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, have
fallen under universal jurisdiction since
1945 (Shaw 595). Article 7 of the Convention against Torture arguably gives states
parties the authority to prosecute alleged torturers even when they are not nationals and
the alleged crimes are claimed to have occurred outside the territory state in question.
During the famous Pinochet extradition
hearings, British judge Lord Millet even
claimed that the prohibition of torture by
custom afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction
to national courts even without taking into
account treaty law (599). The application of
this principle relies on alleged offenders being within the territorial jurisdiction of a
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state government that is willing to prosecute
them, and some governments are more supportive of the doctrine than others. Belgium,
for example, has made universal jurisdiction
an explicit part of its national law. Several
world leaders accused of crimes against humanity have been charged by its courts, including Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon and Paul
Kagame, and Belgian courts have convicted
several Rwandans of participating in genocide (Macedo 3). The United States government, on the other hand, has been generally
hostile toward the concept. Some influential
political and legal experts argue, not without
some merit, that universal jurisdiction could
be abused by state governments in order to
threaten or punish foreign political opponents that would otherwise be protected by
state sovereignty (6). Many state governments will probably refuse to endorse universal jurisdiction because of such concerns,
and so as a solution to the problem of punishing transgressors against international law
the doctrine will be, by itself, inadequate.
In 2002 an institution was created
that seeks, if not to solve, then at least to
ameliorate some of the problems involved in
enforcing international law by providing the
services of a permanent and independent tribunal, namely the International Criminal
Court (hereafter ICC). According to Article
5 of the Rome Statute, the international legal
instrument which created the ICC, it has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and
war crimes. Article 6 defines “crimes
against humanity” to include torture, murder, rape, and imprisonment in violation of
international law, while Article 7 defines
“war crimes” to include grave breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
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Unfortunately, the United States
has not ratified the Rome Statute,
arguing that the independent prosecutor may bring politicized charges
against Americans who, since the
United States is so heavily involved in
world affairs, are more exposed than citizens of other countries (Eleas 7). Since
2002 the U.S. government has actively opposed the ICC in a number of ways. Congress has passed an act that prevents federal
agencies from cooperating with the ICC and
prevents U.S. participation in peacekeeping
missions where there is any danger that
American personnel will be prosecuted by
the ICC (11). Therefore, it is unlikely be
involved in the resolution of the issue of detainees in the war against terrorism.
7. Conclusion
Between the Geneva Conventions,
their Additional Protocols, and the aforementioned human rights treaties, there is no
person, of any category, at any time, in any
situation, anywhere in the world, during war
or peace, who is not protected to some degree by international law. There can be no
detainees or prisoners outside the law as far
as the treaty obligations of the United States
are concerned, regardless of their status as
terrorists or criminals, and no matter
whether they are held within or outside of
U.S. territory.
III. Violations Committed by the Bush
Administration
1. Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush has authorized
a series of military and intelligence operations known collectively as “the war against
terrorism.” In the course of this war mem-
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bers of the United States military and intelligence services have continuously, willfully,
and systematically violated the rights of
thousands of prisoners under both humanitarian law and human rights law, under the
orders and condoning of top officials including generals, members of the Cabinet, and
the President.
American personnel have consistently failed to perform adequate background checks needed to accurately determine whether detainees are POWs, criminals, or innocent civilians who were arrested
by mistake or falsely implicated in military
or terrorist activity. The rights of habeas
corpus and access to regularly established
courts have been denied to prisoners in Iraq
and Guantanamo Bay based on specious legal reasoning, and hundreds of innocent people have been detained for years before being released without charges. Conditions in
prisons run by Americans throughout the
world have been inhumanely unhygienic and
dangerous, sometime through neglect and
sometimes as part of a deliberate plan to
weaken the morale of prisoners prior to interrogation. Detainees have been subject to
torture and inhuman, degrading treatment by
Americans in the course of both interrogations and disciplinary actions. Some prisoners have also been subject to so-called
“extraordinary renditions,” where they have
been transported to other countries for the
purpose of being interrogated and tortured
by non-Americans. In some cases American
forces have extra-judicially killed prisoners
or allowed them to be killed by allied forces.
All of these actions are both morally outrageous and strictly prohibited by international
law.
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2. Arrest without just cause
a. Afghanistan
Even during the initial combat operations in Afghanistan during 2001
there were significant problems with the
identification and processing of prisoners.
A major element of these difficulties was
the U.S.’s reliance on the Northern Alliance,
a group of anti-Taliban militias. The Alliance provided the bulk of the ground troops
during this period so that large numbers of
American soldiers would not have to be
committed, even though their forces had a
history of brutality that rivaled their foes in
the Taliban (Worthington Guantanamo Files
5). In the chaos and confusion of the war, a
number of people were captured by Northern
Alliance soldiers and then turned over to the
Americans for interrogation who had very
little or no connection at all with the Taliban
or Al Qaeda, including travelers, relief
workers, low-ranking foot soldiers, refugees,
and religious teachers (30-38).
Pakistan was another nominal ally of the
United States in the war against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. Pakistani soldiers and government officials proved themselves just as
haphazard and careless in rounding up prisoners to be turned over to the United States
as the Northern Alliance forces. Thousands
of refugees fled across the AfghanistanPakistan border during the course of the war,
and Pakistani soldiers arrested hundreds of
them, mainly foreigners, and turned them
over to the Americans on extremely spurious
grounds. As with the prisoners captured by
the Northern Alliance, there were few people of any real intelligence value among
these prisoners, only a diverse mix of foot
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soldiers, religious scholars, and civilian refugees (49).
The unreliability of American allies to
adequately screen prisoners was exacerbated
by the United States’ own policy of offering
bounties for alleged members of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. Numerous prisoners have
testified that they were falsely accused of
working with or for terrorist groups and then
“sold” to the Americans (46). For example,
one Saudi Arabian explained that he crossed
into Pakistan and was denied access to the
Saudi embassy by Pakistani soldiers until
they handed him over to the United States in
exchange for money (Sebaii 45-46). There
is also evidence that Afghani warlords from
the Northern Alliance have earned money
for transferring suspected terrorists and lowranking Taliban fighters into American custody (Raman).
American personnel also made their own
blunders when it came to identifying and
capturing suspected terrorists in Afghanistan, the most incomprehensible being the
arrest of five political prisoners that had previously been held by the Taliban. Because
these men were foreigners, the Northern Alliance forced them to remain in prison even
after the Taliban had been driven off, supposedly for their own safety. Even though
they had been imprisoned by the Taliban for
being suspected anti-fundamentalist spies,
American agents later took them prisoner
and sent them to the Guantanamo Bay
Prison (Worthington Guantanamo Files
114).
Given the chaotic nature of war in general, the especially disorganized nature of
Afghanistan, and the obvious risks that
unlawful and unwarranted arrests would
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arise from offering these bounties,
the United States should have been
extremely careful in examining the
backgrounds of prisoners and checking
the stories of those who claimed innocence. In fact, American officials were
incredibly lax in this regard, assuming as a
matter of course that most or all of the detainees in U.S.-run prisons in Afghanistan
were guilty of committing or conspiring to
commit acts of terrorism. The tribunals
mandated by GC III to determine whether a
belligerent belonged to a protected category
of persons were completely absent at this
point in time (90). Without any legallyprescribed mechanisms for determining who
belonged in prison, the United States has
held hundreds of people prisoner without
any legally justifiable reason for unacceptably long periods of time before discovering
or deciding that they are not threats and subsequently releasing them without charge.
An example of the stubborn refusal of
United States government officials to consider that a prisoner might not be a terrorist
during this time is the case of Mohammed
Sadiq. He was a civilian who was over 80
years old when he was arrested by American
soldiers, apparently because one of his family members was suspected of working for
the Taliban. Even he, as obviously harmless
as he was, spent several months under arrest
before the United States released him
(Raman). Many others whose innocence
could have been determined by a brief investigation immediately after their capture were
held prisoner in Afghanistan and Cuba for
years before being released without charge.
There was, for example, Khalid al Morghi,
the son of a senior Saudi Arabian military
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officer, who took a leave of absence from
his white-collar job to perform charitable aid
work in Afghanistan – hardly the portrait of
a hardcore terrorist, or any sort of combatant
at all. He was still held, first in Afghanistan
and later in Guantanamo Bay, for over four
years before being released (Worthington
Guantanamo Files 54).
The “competent tribunals” required by
GC III to determine the eligibility of prisoners for protection under humanitarian law
did not appear until years after the war began, and even then they were too little, too
late. The Combatant Status Review Tribunals that were announced in July 2004 suffered from tremendous difficulties for a several reasons. First, the prisoners were denied access to lawyers during the tribunals.
Second, the court was allowed to hear secret
evidence to which the prisoners had no access. Third, the tribunals were held far away
from the battlefield and a long time after the
persons in question had been captured, making it very difficult for the defendants to call
witnesses who might have known them to
testify on their behalf. Finally, even when
prisoners did provide addresses or telephone
numbers for people that might have testified
for them, the court apparently made no effort
whatsoever to find them (267).
To sum up, the United States exhibited
extreme negligence and willful disregard for
international law in the way it processed alleged terrorists and criminals during the
early part of the fighting in Afghanistan.
The shocking thoughtlessness with which
prisoners were initially assumed to be guilty
and subsequently held in custody for months
or years without an investigation was in direct contravention of international
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humanitarian and human rights
law10 and also offensive to common
moral sensibilities. The Bush administration and U.S. military and government officials should have anticipated
the possibility of wrongful arrests during
a confusing and complicated war, but instead displayed an attitude of unwarranted
confidence that anyone under arrest must
have done something to deserve it, an attitude which it would carry into its handling
of the long-term detention, trial procedures,
and treatment of prisoners outside of Afghanistan.
b. Iraq
The Abu Ghraib prison facility was taken
over by the United States in 2003, initially
as part of the creation of a new Iraqi criminal justice system; most of the other prisons
in the country had been ransacked beyond
salvation by looters, and there were few
other options available. It was not intended,
at first, to be used for detention operations
by the American military (Gourevitch 19).
The increasing frequency of insurgent
attacks in Baghdad caused American authorities to change that policy. Iraqis arrested by American soldiers on patrol were
put into Abu Ghraib because there was literally nowhere else for them to go, even
though the prison’s location in a hostile area
meant it came under mortar attack frequently. GC III provides that POW camps
or other internment areas should not be located in especially dangerous places, and the
Red Cross determined that American personnel had not taken sufficient measures to
offer protection from shelling to the prisoners (Greenberg 403). Military prisoners and
civilian prisoners were supposed to be han-
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dled separately from each other, and officially there was an attempt to do that, with a
temporary tent encampment meant specifically for the civilians. However, the distinction between the two types of prisoners
became less and less meaningful to the
guards and administrators as the number of
prisoners continued to increase beyond what
they had been prepared to handle
(Gourevitch 23).
Many prisoners were arrested on little
evidence and were held long after they
should have been released. In 2003 Red
Cross inspectors were told by intelligence
officers that they believed well over half the
prison population of Iraq was kept there mistakenly (Greenberg 388). It was not uncommon for American soldiers on patrol to arrest anyone and everyone who was around
during the aftermath of an attack. Firing
weapons in celebration was a fairly common
practice in Iraq, and according to a member
of the Justice Department’s Iraq rebuilding
team, people were arrested for doing it
(Gourevitch 23). The biggest problem was
that it was difficult for these people to get
released from Abu Ghraib even after it was
fairly apparent that they did not belong.
Even when judges and lawyers arranged for
a prisoner to be released, the military would
sometimes prevent it from happening. Some
of the delays were probably just the result of
bureaucratic errors, but the increasing demand for useful intelligence about insurgents also started to contribute as well; often
prisoners that would otherwise have been
released were kept in the prison because of
supposed “intelligence value,” assessments
that the top on-site civilian administrator put
little stock in (24).
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The system of notification and information dissemination in Iraq was
extremely flawed in 2003 as well. It
was rare for those making arrests to
properly inform suspects or their families of why they were being arrested or
where they were taken, and the military
usually failed to notify the families of suspects detained while away from their homes
that they had been arrested at all. The
ICRC, which otherwise would have helped
notify families as quickly as possible, often
received no or improperly completed paperwork from the United States military, resulting in unnecessary delays (Greenberg 389).
Among all the prisoners at Abu Ghraib,
the ones that arguably least deserved to be
there were the mentally ill ones, of which
there may have been as many as ten. Many
were delusional or schizophrenic, engaging
in violent and unhygienic behavior that was
unsafe for other prisoners, the guards, and
themselves. These people should have been
in a mental hospital instead of a military
prison, or at least under the care of qualified
mental health professionals. There were
none at Abu Ghraib, and even though many
potentially helpful drugs were available at
the facility, without doctors to prescribe
them guards just gave the mentally ill prisoners Benadryl and tried to deal with their
behavior as best as they could (Gourevitch
145).
Many prisoners who were not obviously
innocent civilians, including insurgents and
some former members of Saddam Hussein’s
Iraqi military, which had been officially disbanded after the capture of Baghdad, were
held by the United States officially as nonPOWs because they were not members of a
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military force of a State Party to the Geneva
Conventions. According to one interrogator,
a senior intelligence official reported that
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had told him
that insurgents were not protected by the Geneva Conventions and all interrogation techniques were usable, including dogs (211).
Rather, their detentions were justified as the
necessary imprisonment of those suspected
of spying, sabotage, or other hostilities. Article 5 of GC IV does allow such detentions,
but the ICRC has always held that its provisions should only be applied to exceptional
cases and on an individual basis (33). Applying it to the detention of thousands of
prisoners at the same time may, arguably,
have been within the letter of the law, but it
was most certainly in violation of its spirit.
The American soldiers in Baghdad can be
excused for being aggressive with initial arrests; however, that people with no apparent
connection to insurgents or terrorists were
kept imprisoned instead of released quickly
is unacceptable. Especially in a war zone
with a shortage of space for prisoners, there
seems little rationale for detaining more people than absolutely necessary. The same
overly confident attitude from Afghanistan,
the idea that anyone who was put in jail by
an American must have done something
wrong, was combined with the chaotic state
of the country, its new justice system, and
the American command structure to create a
situation where many innocent civilians
were put in prison for far longer than they
should have been.
3. Indefinite Detention and Unfair Trials
The prison at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, Cuba, has held over 750 prisoners
since it opened in January 2002 (CBC).
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None of them had a fair trial or
easy access to an impartial court
while they were there, a situation that
has famously been called a “legal black
hole” (Steyn). The legal basis for their
imprisonment was President Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, which
stated that any non-citizens of the United
States could be detained, without any specified time limit, if the President believed they
were involved in terrorism or if it was in the
interests of the United States that they be
detained (Greenberg 26).
The Bush administration chose Guantanamo Bay as the location of the prison specifically to prevent the detainees from ever
having access to an independent court in
which they could challenge their detentions,
complain about their treatment, or have a
fair trial. A memorandum submitted to the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense on 28 December 2001, written by John
Yoo and Patrick Philbin, who were both
Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals at the
time, demonstrates that quite clearly. The
memo argued that federal courts should not
and probably would not find that they could
exercise jurisdiction over an alien detained
in Guantanamo Bay, and that chances were
small that a judge would decide to grant a
habeas corpus hearing in response to a petition filed by such a person (37).
Why was the administration so intent on
preventing federal courts from having access
to the detention camp? Apparently, top officials had already decided that all of the prisoners were guilty, and they didn’t need or
want any independent court to get involved
and potentially challenge their decisions.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for
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example, stated publicly in January 2002
that the Guantanamo prisoners were
“committed terrorists,” and later that same
month said that the prisoners were among
the worst, most violent criminals in the
world. American generals gave statements
to similar effect about the prisoners as well
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 127).
These statements were being made about
people who had never appeared in a court of
law, much less been convicted in a fair trial.
The simplest solution to preventing the
detainees from filing for habeas corpus or
otherwise justifying their release would have
been to classify them as prisoners of war,
which Secretary of State Powell indeed argued should have been done (Greenberg
123). However, for reasons which will be
explained below, the administration decided
to classify them as “unlawful combatants” in
an attempt to prevent the Geneva Conventions from applying to them (Worthington
Guantanamo Files 128). The government
was trying to have it both ways: locking up
prisoners indefinitely and without putting
them on trial as if they were POWs, but otherwise behaving as if they were criminals.
The administration wasn’t entirely opposed to the idea of trials, but it wanted
those trials on its terms and more or less under its control. The same Military Order that
President Bush issued to justify the detention of suspected terrorists also provided for
military tribunals to determine whether suspected terrorists were guilty of war crimes,
and that the danger to the United States
posed by such persons necessitated that the
rules of law and evidence in normal cases
could not be applied. According to the order, appointments to said commissions
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would be made by the Secretary of
Defense, and either he or the President could review and decide on the
conviction or sentencing of a trial. Furthermore, any person subject to such a
tribunal would be unable to appeal the
decision in any American, foreign, or international court (Greenberg 25-28). Because
the judges would be military officers who
take orders from the President they could
never be truly independent of executive authority (Koh “The Case Against Military
Commissions” 339). Military tribunals as
prescribed by the President’s Military Order
would almost certainly never meet the fairness and independence requirements of either the Geneva Conventions or the ICCPR.
One need not turn to hypothetical situations to see how unfair a trial by military
commission would be, of course. The first
military trial of an “unlawful combatant” to
be successfully concluded (in July 2008,
more than six years after the Guantanamo
prison opened) was the trial of Salim Hamdan, a man accused of working as a driver
and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. (It
was, in fact, because of his exclusion from
parts of an earlier trial that the Supreme
Court decided that military commissions
violated the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld.) The trial was riddled with
problems, including the hearing of secret
testimony behind closed doors, the acceptance of hearsay evidence of highly dubious
validity, and the presentation of pointless,
prejudicial evidence, supposedly meant to
inform the jurors about the nature of Al
Qaeda, but which served only as terrifying
propaganda (Worthington “A critical overview”).
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What’s worse, the court’s sentence seems
to have no relationship with the reality of
Hamdan’s detention. A Pentagon spokesman has stated that even when Hamdan is
finished serving his sentence,11 he may still
be subject to potentially indefinite detention
as an “enemy combatant” (CNN). This is
nothing less than a mockery of justice and a
demonstration of the paradoxical reasoning
of the Bush administration. Hamdan was
deprived of prisoner of war rights for allegedly violating the laws of war, but even after
he has been convicted and punished according to what passes for justice in Guantanamo, the administration wants to hold
him indefinitely as something other than a
POW anyway. This, at least as much as
anything else, should prove that President
Bush and his advisors did not care about justice or the rule of law, whether international
or domestic, when it comes to the detainee
victims of the war against terrorism.
4. Torture
a. Overview
Torture and activity degrading to human
dignity have been used during the war on
terror by the United States, at first, as interrogation methods, in spite of the unequivocal ban on such techniques by international
law. The use of such techniques was authorized at the highest levels of the civilian and
military command structure (Greenberg
360).
b. Torture by American personnel
i. Afghanistan
The use of torture and degrading treatment began early on during military operations in Afghanistan, even before the official
opening of any permanent prison sites. Notably, in December 2001 John Walker
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Lindh, known colloquially in the
U.S. media as “the American Taliban,” was made to pose for humiliating photographs, threatened with death,
taped to a stretcher while naked during
interrogations, and denied medical treatment for his injuries, including a bullet
wound in his leg, for several days
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 82). The
office of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,
who was monitoring the interrogation
closely, authorized the military interrogators
in charge of Lindh to “take the gloves off”
during the process (Roth and Worden 165).
Another detainee who, like Lindh, immediately received extra attention from American
soldiers and interrogators because of his race
and nationality, was David Hicks, an Australian who fought for the Taliban. Hicks has
claimed in an official affidavit that shortly
after he was handed over to American authorities he had guns pointed at him and was
threatened with death, and that later he was
imprisoned onboard a naval ship where he
was not given sufficient quantities of food.
He also stated that he was transported to unknown locations and forced to kneel in uncomfortable positions for hours at a time
while being struck by guards before being
transported to the Kandahar prison (Bonner).
A permanent prison in Kandahar opened
in January 2002, and for the first time a large
number of prisoners were entered into the
interrogation system. At first the interrogators tried to hew to the rules of behavior set
by the Geneva Conventions and military
regulations, but as the demand for useful
intelligence increased they became more
violent. Many prisoners were physically
beaten, restrained, had their fingers broken,
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or had hard objects thrown at their heads
during interrogations. Even these methods,
brutal as they were, are relatively tame compared to the most extreme techniques used
by some interrogators outside the usual Military Intelligence chain of command, including Special Forces soldiers and agents of the
CIA and FBI. These extreme techniques
included burning prisoners with scalding
liquids and cigarettes, sexual violations, and
application of electrical shocks. Many prisoners asserted that these actions were often
photographed and that those photographs
were used in later interrogations to threaten
prisoners (Worthington Guantanamo Files
94-98).
The behavior of the prison guards was, if
anything, even worse. The relaxation of Geneva Convention standards, combined with
the general spirit of taking vengeance for the
September 11 terrorist attacks, made the
American guards especially prone to violent
overreactions and arbitrary abuses. American soldiers were told that their prisoners
were “nobodies,” and at least one believed
that if the Geneva Conventions had been applied and the prisoners labeled as “soldiers”
then they would have been treated with more
respect (Jehl). Beatings were common responses to rule violations, and prisoners
were often denied adequate amounts of sleep
because of “inspections” during the night
that forced them to stand outside in the cold.
Even harsher exposure to extreme cold was
not unheard of at Kandahar, either, as many
prisoners stated that they were exposed to
the cold while naked, and at least one had
cold water thrown on his body during the
night. “Stress positions,” the binding of
prisoners in a way meant to cause them
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physical pain, was also fairly common.
Psychological abuses also occurred, often in tandem with the physical ones. Prisoners were often forced to
go naked while they were abused and
were mocked and photographed in the process. Many had their beards, which are important to maintain for Muslims, shaved
against their wills. Although each detainee
was given his own copy of the Koran, some
guards damaged and desecrated the holy
books in order to taunt them; yelling insulting profanities about Islam and the Prophet
Mohammed were fairly common as well
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 88).
The Kandahar facility was the main U.S.run prison in Afghanistan for only a few
months, and in the spring of 2002 many detainees were transferred from that location to
the prison at Bagram Air Force Base, which
has served as the central United States military prison in the country ever since. As a
prison camp Bagram left much to be desired,
with hastily thrown together cells and pens
made from wood and barbed wire, and windows boarded up with rusty sheets of iron
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 170).
The abuse from guards and interrogators
did not improve during the transition from
Kandahar, either. Stress positions and sleep
deprivation were incorporated into interrogation routines as pressure to obtain intelligence grew stronger. Even the most welltrained and ethical military interrogators
went farther than they had before the move,
keeping prisoners awake in long sessions for
as long as the interrogators themselves could
stay up, a process informally called
“monstering.” The name reflected that these

SUNY Geneseo

early interrogators considered it the worst,
cruelest technique that they were willing to
use. When new, less experienced interrogators were sent to work at Bagram they increased the upper limit of sleep deprivation
to 36 hours, ordered increased amounts of
isolation and handcuffing outside of interrogation rooms, and generally allowed themselves to use other coercive techniques with
greater frequency as time went by (Mackey
471). Unwarranted violence from the guards
was as bad as it had ever been in Kandahar,
if not worse, and the litany of beatings, humiliations, religious insults, death threats,
rapes, and electrical torture continued unabated (Worthington Guantanamo Files
170).
The perhaps inevitable result of this culture of abuse was death; at least two Bagram
inmates have died as a result of physical
abuse from guards. Both confirmed deaths
were largely caused by reservists untrained
in detention using powerful blows to the legs
as disciplinary measures. Mullah Habibullah was shackled in a holding cell and struck
in the legs repeatedly over several days before he succumbed to his injuries and died
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 188). The
second man, known only as Dilawar, was
chained and beaten repeatedly for apparent
non-compliance during an interrogation, and
died after five days. Official press releases
ascribed the deaths only to heart attacks, but
documentation from army doctors indicates
that the damage to the legs was the most important factor (McCoy 126). Two of the soldiers directly involved in the deaths were
convicted of criminal abuse in 2005 and sentenced to only a few months imprisonment;
no officers were prosecuted at all (BBC
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News).
ii. Guantanamo Bay
During most of the first year of its
existence, interrogations at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility were
fairly mild. During this time mistreatment involved general conditions, like open
-air cages for living quarters and insufficient
amounts of food, an atmosphere of uncertainty leading to intense fear, and large
amounts of verbal abuse from the guards
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 132). The
worst, most violent transgressions were
committed by the Extreme Reaction Force,
or ERF, a squad of soldiers in riot gear who
would respond to minor or nonexistent misbehavior with incredible savagery. Tarak
Dergoul, a Guantanamo detainee that was
frequently targeted by the ERF because he
organized prisoner strikes, was so traumatized by his experiences that he needed psychological counseling after his release
(Rose).
Conditions in Guantanamo became much
worse in October 2002 when, due to frustrations from the lack of good intelligence, Major General Geoffrey Miller was appointed
as the new commander of the base. His
predecessor was considered “soft” for allowing detainees to keep their Korans and criticizing guards for committing verbal abuse
(Goldenberg). It was Miller that decided
that the best way to obtain results was to coordinate the activities of the Military Police
guards and the Military Intelligence interrogators - as he put it, to “set the conditions.”
This meant that every aspect of the lives of
the detainees was geared toward making
them “break” under interrogation. In practice, this meant more beatings of
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“uncooperative” prisoners by guards, including, the continued use of the ERF teams, and
the institution of new interrogation routines
involving prolonged exposure to extreme
temperatures
and
sleep
deprivation
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 193).
Miller’s appointment roughly coincided
with high-level decisions to explicitly authorize more violent forms of interrogation.
In November 2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld responded positively to a request for
new interrogation methods, explicitly allowing such techniques as stress positions, sensory and sleep deprivation, removing religious paraphernalia, the forced shaving of
facial hair, and the use of dogs to frighten
detainees. Rumsfeld rescinded his authorization several weeks later (Greenberg 237239). According to an official log that was
leaked to Time magazine, during that interim
the harsh techniques were used against Mohammed al-Qahtani, infamously known as
the “twentieth hijacker” of the September
11th attacks, including sleep deprivation and
stress positions. Additionally, female interrogators would frequently invade his personal space in order to humiliate him.12 Recently, the top legal military official in
Guantanamo Bay has stated that she will not
refer al-Qahtani to prosecution because the
treatment he suffered amounts to torture
(Woodward).
The administration was apparently
pleased with the changes that General Miller
had brought to Guantanamo Bay. In September 2003, he was sent to Iraq in order to
provide a similar overhaul to the interrogation operations at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, where the same practice of
using the guards to constantly maintain an
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environment supposedly conducive
to successful interrogations was instituted and mentioned in the Army’s
internal
investigation
of
abuse
(Goldenberg).
iii. Iraq
An ICRC report released in 2004 and
based on data gathered between February
and November 2003 indicates that during
that period in Iraq some level of brutality on
the part of United States military personnel
was present in every step of the detention
process. At the time of arrest soldiers would
often threaten or strike suspects who had
their hands cuffed behind their backs. During transfers to prisons the treatment was
even worse, as several severe beatings were
reported, many resulting in serious injuries
and a least one resulting in death. At least
two cases of major burns caused by forced
contact with hot metal surfaces were also
reported (Greenberg 390). The very worst
documented instances of mistreatment,
which rose to the level of torture according
to the Red Cross, occurred during interrogations performed by members of the US
Army’s Military Intelligence Corps.
The most common technique used by
Military Intelligence (or MI) interrogators at
Abu Ghraib was the solitary confinement of
interrogation subjects in completely empty,
totally dark rooms, for days at a time, while
naked; cooperation with interrogators merited “rewards” such as beds, clothing, and
light. Other abusive methods observed by
the Red Cross included sleep deprivation,
binding of the hands in a manner that caused
wrist wounds, and being forced to walk
through the facility’s hallways while naked.
The ICRC medical inspector discovered that
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several detainees had psychological problems, such as poor memory and suicidal tendencies, which were judged to have resulted
from the physical and mental stress of their
interrogations (Greenberg 393).
Oddly enough, the report stated that the
worst sorts of abuse mostly did not occur to
detainees that were being held in regular
prison facilities run by military police. It
noted that guards sometimes slapped or
shoved detainees, and that one disciplinary
measure used against detainees was forced
exposure to the sun while handcuffed for as
many as four hours, in addition to the more
ordinary measures of temporary solitary
confinement and withholding of cigarette
rations (Greenberg 397). That raises the
question: Why was it that most of the soldiers charged and convicted with crimes in
regard to the Abu Ghraib scandal were
members of the Military Police Corps, and
not MI personnel, when their behavior was
relatively benign by comparison?
Part of the answer is that some MP
guards were committing serious abuses that
the ICRC apparently did not observe or collect information about. In accordance with
General Miller’s transplanted Guantanamo
policy the MPs took orders regarding prisoner treatment from interrogators, who consisted mostly of MI personnel, but also
anonymous officials thought to be working
for the FBI or CIA, called OGA (for “other
government agencies”) by the guards. The
MPs were responsible for maintaining the
sleep deprivation of certain prisoners with
yelling, door slamming, or loud music and
taking away clothes from certain detainees
and providing only women’s underwear for
them to wear, in order to humiliate them.
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Often the MPs were instructed to
“soften up” detainees prior to interrogations; how exactly was left to
their discretion, but the most common
method was forcing them to exercise for
several minutes (Gourevitch 98). This
behavior had psychological repercussions,
not only for the prisoners but for the guards
as well. One MP guard described how the
process had numbed him to the point where
he was no longer shocked or repulsed by
what he was asked to do. Torturing prisoners
at the behest of interrogators had become a
normal experience for him (104). Given the
deleterious effects on the moral sensibilities
of the MPs, it is not surprising that they displayed unwarranted violence towards prisoners on their own later.
The best-known image of abuse from
Abu Ghraib is a photograph of a man wearing a poncho and hood, standing on a box
with wires attached to his hands. On November 3rd, 2003, the MPs had been told that
this prisoner was lying about his identity and
were instructed to make him to confess his
real name. At first his treatment was typical
- sleep deprivation, yelling, stress positions,
forced exercise. Then, inactive electrical
wires were tied to his fingers, and the prisoner was told he would be electrocuted if he
fell off of the box he was standing on (177).
It looks bad, and it is bad, but for all of the
photograph’s infamy it doesn’t come close
to being the worst abuse at the prison, even
by the Military Police.
The most egregious acts carried out by
MPs on their own initiative and not at the
behest of interrogators took place a few days
later. A group of seven prisoners thought to
have instigated riots out in the tents were
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transferred to the MI cells, and for several
hours before the guards brought them to
their cells they were stripped naked, beaten
about the hands, feet, face and chest, verbally assaulted, forced to form a “pyramid”
or “dog-pile” while being photographed, and
put in positions simulating sex and masturbation. The MPs had never committed
abuse on that scale before, and they never
did again (196). It was unusual enough that
several guards felt the need to report the incident to superior officers, but none of them
seemed to make much of it (200).
Because of reports of prisoner abuse, lax
discipline, and prisoner escapes at Abu
Ghraib, an investigation was launched. The
result was an Army document referred to as
the “Taguba Report” after the general in
charge of the investigation. The report
found that abuse of prisoners by guards had
occurred; in addition to the aforementioned
examples, improper use of military dogs,
threatening detainees with rape and death by
gunshot, and pouring phosphoric substances
from chemical lights onto detainees were
also described in the report. Of the thirteen
people named as suspects, two were civilian
contractors, one was an MI sergeant, and the
rest were all members of the Military Police,
none above the rank of Staff Sergeant
(Greenberg 417). General Taguba also
found that the guards at Abu Ghraib had insufficient training in detention operations
and the rules of international humanitarian
law, and that copies of the Geneva Conventions were not provided in sufficient numbers to American personnel or the prisoners,
and that prison commander General Karpinski had done too little to disseminate information and prevent abuse. He
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recommended an overhaul of operating procedures, training in detention and the laws of war for all personnel involved with prisons, and an
inquiry into MI interrogators regarding
their role in prison abuse (420).
When the shocking photographs of the
abuse at Abu Ghraib taken by soldiers were
leaked to the press and shown on national
television some sort of action was necessary.
Several Military Police and a few Military
Intelligence soldiers were court-martialed
and convicted of crimes such as assault, conspiracy, or dereliction of duty. Only one
commissioned officer, who was found innocent, was court-martialed. A few others
faced fines and administrative reprimands,
and Brigadier General Karpinski was demoted one rank and relieved of her command. No one was charged with torture or
war crimes. No OGA or civilian interrogators were ever brought to trial. Brigadier
General Jane Karpinski, the MP commander,
was demoted one rank. General Miller was
never brought to account for his recommendations, and senior officials were not held
responsible for allowing the situation to deteriorate to such a level in the first place
(270). Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez,
who had authorized the use of extreme psychological torture techniques that had been
developed by the CIA without telling the
MP commander or officers, faced no official
consequences either (McCoy 134). What
the guards did in Abu Ghraib was wrong,
and they should have been punished for it;
using orders from a superior as a justification for war crimes has been a non-starter
since the Nuremberg trials. However, that
doesn’t mean that those who gave the orders,
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and those who created conditions where
such orders could conceivable be given and
carried out, do not bear any responsibility
either.
iv. Secret prisons
In addition to the major prisons in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Cuba, smaller prisons officially known as “black sites” that were operated by the Central Intelligence Agency existed in those countries and other places
throughout the world, including Thailand
and Eastern Europe. These black sites were
used for the purpose of detaining and interrogating prisoners thought to possess especially important information about Al Qaeda
or other terrorist organizations without any
official oversight or acknowledgment of
their existence. The so-called “ghost” prisoners were held secretly, without access to
lawyers, agents of the press, or representatives of the Red Cross, and their CIA interrogators were allowed to subject them to the
same types of degrading and torturous methods that had been used in Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo (Priest “CIA Holds Terror Suspects”).
Several “enhanced” interrogation techniques were also officially authorized for use
at the black sites in addition to what was
standard elsewhere, including a severe form
of stress positions that could be used on a
prisoner for over forty hours at a time, constantly dousing naked prisoners with cold
water while locked in a cold cell, severe
sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation and
bombardment and, most infamously, waterboarding. This latter method involves binding a prisoner, covering his mouth, and
pouring water onto his face in order to cause
the same physiological and mental
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sensations as drowning. These
procedures were used against about
a dozen prisoners believed to be senior members of Al Qaeda who possessed important information, including
Khalid Sheik Mohammed (or “KSM”),
who is regarded as the primary planner of
the September 11th attacks (Ross). Waterboarding was used on three of these prisoners; KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and Abd alRahim al-Nashiri (Bradbury “Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture”
6). Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times in
August 2002, and KSM suffered it 183 times
in March 2003, averaging out to approximately 3 and 6 waterboarding sessions per
day, respectively (37).
The other ghost prisoners, while not subjected to the most extreme “enhanced” techniques, still suffered a great deal, especially
the ones being held in the black sites of Afghanistan. Several prisoners who have been
released from the secret prisons in that country reported multiple forms of torture and
abuse, including sleep deprivation, starvation, and exposure to extreme cold weather.
One unidentified inmate of a secret prison in
Afghanistan that was codenamed the “Salt
Pit” had his clothing removed on the orders
of a CIA interrogator and subsequently died
of hypothermia in his cell during the night
(Priest “CIA Avoids Scrutiny”).
The black sites represent the very worst
excesses of the Bush Administration’s detainee policy. The level of torture, the secrecy and lack of accountability, and the total subversion of due process and international law went beyond even the Guantanamo Bay camp. Fortunately, much like
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Guantanamo the black sites were ordered
closed by an executive order of President
Obama shortly after his inauguration. Unfortunately, the fact that these senior Al
Qaeda members, including Khalid Sheik
Mohammed, underwent waterboarding and
other forms of torture and degrading treatment will immensely complicate their future
trials.
c. Extraordinary renditions
The term “extraordinary rendition” refers
to the practice of secretly transporting a prisoner to another country, generally the same
one where the prisoner in question was born,
and giving him into the custody of that
country’s security forces in order to be interrogated and potentially prosecuted. In itself
the idea is not necessarily illegal, but since
2001 the Bush administration has turned
over many prisoners to foreign countries
when there has been a high probability, or
even an expectation, that they would be tortured while in their custody, contravening
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture.
Renditions were practiced on a limited
basis during the 1990s, exclusively for individuals with standing arrest warrants or in
absentia convictions in foreign countries
(usually Egypt), with safeguards to protect
innocent people from rendition and some
sort of assurance that torture would not take
place, although even back then those assurances were generally not worth much
(Mayer). As bad as the program was in the
1990s, the flaws of the rendition program
were magnified as its use was expanded after September 2001.
Under the Bush administration the CIA
has renditioned several people only suspected of terrorism, and in many cases the
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evidence connecting these persons
with terrorist organizations was very
weak. For example, Maher Arar is a
Canadian citizen who was born in
Syria. He was arrested in an airport because he knew (vaguely) another man
suspected of terrorism. On that flimsy basis
Arar was transported to Syria, where he was
held for a year and tortured by security personnel before being released without
charges; the Syrians had apparently not
found any connection between him and any
terrorist organization in that time (Mayer).
In addition to Egypt and Syria, prisoners
were also renditioned to other countries
where torture and prisoner abuse are known
to be fairly common, including Uzbekistan
and (to a lesser extent) Jordan. CIA officials
not only suspected that these countries were
torturing the prisoners that they were receiving from the United States but expected it;
the senior CIA operative in the Uzbek capital told the British ambassador that he knew
that the Uzbek government was torturing
prisoners for information (Grey). At least
one man was transported from Pakistan to
Morocco expressly because the Moroccans
were willing to use methods that the Pakistanis weren’t, including the infliction of
small cuts all over the body over a long period of time (Worthington Guantanamo Files
230).
It is impossible to imagine that the threat
of prisoners being tortured once sent into the
custody of these countries is not substantial
enough to qualify for Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. In carrying out extraordinary renditions government agents not
only neglected their responsibilities under
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the Convention against Torture but actively
sought to violate its requirements.
IV. Legal Justifications
Members of the Bush administration
have presented a number of legal arguments,
both internally and externally, which justify
or excuse the abusive treatment of detainees
suspected of involvement in terrorist activities and direct responsibility for committing
the most unpalatable abuses away from top
officials. These arguments are severely
lacking in a number of respects, although not
to the point of being frivolous. It is therefore necessary to examine them in some detail in order to present thorough counterarguments.
1. Inapplicability of International Law
Starting in the early years of the war on
terrorism, several legal advisors within the
White House advanced arguments to the effect that the Geneva Conventions could be
interpreted to not apply to prisoners suspected of terrorist activity. They also asserted that other elements of international
humanitarian and human rights law could
not restrict the decisions of the President regarding the matter of detainees who posed a
potential security threat to the United States.
Deputy Assistant John Yoo drafted a
memorandum for the United States Department of Defense in January 2002 that put
forth three reasons why members of Al
Qaeda would not be protected by the Geneva
Conventions if they were captured in Afghanistan: Al Qaeda is not a State Party to
the Geneva Conventions; the war in Afghanistan is neither a war between states nor
a civil war, and therefore is not under the
purview of the Conventions; and Al Qaeda
members do not obey the laws of war as
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required by GC III Article 4(a)(2),
such as carrying arms openly and
wearing uniforms or visible symbols
to distinguish themselves from civilians
(Greenberg 49).
This memo also argued that members
of the Taliban would not need to be afforded protections under the Conventions
even though Afghanistan is a State Party because Afghanistan was a failed state while
the Taliban controlled it, and because the
Taliban was connected so closely with Al
Qaeda that the two organizations could not
be legally distinguished from each other
(50). Even if international humanitarian law
applied in Afghanistan, the memo argued,
Taliban members would still not be protected by GC III because of their failure to
meet the Article 4(a)(2) requirements, and
that competent tribunals required by Article
5 would be unnecessary if the President determined that all Taliban members failed to
meet those requirements, thus supposedly
removing “doubt” as to their legal status and
obviating the need for the tribunals to eliminate it (110). It stated that even if the substance of the Geneva Conventions or other
instruments of international humanitarian
law were a part of customary international
law, it would not matter because customary
law is not the federal law of the United
States and therefore is incapable of binding
the powers of the President (112).
Shortly after receiving the memorandum
described above, Alberto Gonzales sent his
own memo to President Bush, advising him
of the positive and negative ramifications of
disregarding the Geneva Conventions in the
Afghanistan war.13 In his arguments against
the likelihood of the negative outcomes hap-
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pening, Gonzales asserted that the Bush’s
official orders to treat prisoners “humanely”
would prevent severe backlashes from other
countries and the undermining of American
military culture (119-121). On 7 February
2002, President Bush gave orders to the effect that GC III did not apply to Al Qaeda
and that all Taliban detainees were to be
considered unlawful combatants instead of
POWs, but that they should be treated humanely anyway “[a]s a matter of policy” but
not a matter of law (135).
An internal report on detainee interrogation was largely informed by these Justice
Department opinions, and also asserted that
the United States has held that the ICCPR
does not apply to international military operations (243).
2. Redefining Torture
Lawyers working in the Bush administration advanced extremely restrictive municipal and international legal definitions of the
word “torture” in a pair of controversial
memos, both of which were dated 1 August
2002 and were sent to Alberto Gonzales.
The first, written by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee of the Office of Legal Counsel, concerned the application of domestic
legal prohibitions of torture. The second, by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo, was about international law and what it
would allow in interrogations of Al Qaeda
members.
The Bybee memo referred to the
definition of torture that is found in the
United States Code Section 2340, the operative words being “severe physical or mental
pain or suffering.” It attempted to refine that
definition further, by showing that the
phrase “severe pain” as used in other
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American statutes meant an indicator of dangerous and permanent
physical damage. Bybee argued that
this phrase meant the same thing in the
legal definition of torture, and that
therefore pain
…must rise to a similarly high level the level that would ordinarily be
associated with a sufficiently serious
physical condition or injury such as
death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions – in order
to constitute torture. (Greenberg 176)
Section 2340 further defines “severe
mental pain of suffering” as “prolonged
mental harm” caused by certain intentional
acts, such as the infliction of pain, administration of drugs, or threats to do the same.
Bybee focused on the word “prolonged” in
interpreting the statute, arguing that the
strain from long interrogation would probably not qualify, whereas actions resulting in
post-traumatic stress disorder or depression
possibly could. The memo also argued that
any potential defendant must have intended
to cause this prolonged mental harm in order
to be guilty under the terms of Section 2340;
if he acted with some other purpose in good
faith with the belief that his actions would
not result in that kind of mental damage, that
should provide a sufficient defense against
prosecution regardless of the actual outcome
of his actions, according to this argument
(178).
Regarding cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, the memo notes that the Convention against Torture calls only for state parties to “prevent” such acts from being carried out in areas under their jurisdiction.
This is interpreted to mean that the CAT
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does not require such acts to be criminalized,
further demonstrating that “torture” is at the
farthest, most extreme end of the spectrum
of methods of inflicting pain (185).
Ultimately, the Bybee memo concluded
that the word “torture” legally referred to
only the most extreme actions of inflicting
physical and mental pain, and that there
were many acts which would be cruel and
degrading without actually being on the
same level as torture (214).
The John Yoo memo noted that when the
United States acceded to the Convention
against Torture, the administration of the
first President Bush included a reservation to
the treaty to the effect that it understood
“torture” as relating to the Convention to
have the same definition as found in Section
2340, and that it was ratified with this meaning in mind. Because treaties cannot affect a
state without its consent, the memo argued,
it is by this definition of torture that the
United States is bound by the CAT (220).
Taken together with the Bybee memo sent to
Alberto Gonzales on the same day, this
means that the same very narrow and extreme definition of what constitutes torture
also applies to the treaty obligations of the
United States under the CAT.
Additionally, legal opinions regarding the
legality of specific interrogation methods
were also issued by the Justice Department.
One was sent to the CIA’s General Counsel
by Jay Bybee on 1 August 2002, the same
day the memos regarding the general definition of torture were officially transmitted.
This memo regarded techniques the CIA
wanted to use in the interrogation of suspected Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah, including forced standing, stress positions,
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physical blows, sleep deprivation,
and waterboarding (Bybee 2). It
ultimately concluded that all of the
techniques failed to qualify as “torture”
under the international legal obligations
of the United States (18). Another memo
concerning techniques that could be used
on “a High Value al Qaeda Detainee” during
CIA interrogations was issued in May 2005,
covering a greater number of methods
(including force nudity and dousing with
cold water) that still encompassed stress positions and waterboarding (Bradbury “Re:
Application of 18 U.S.C. 18 § § 23402340A” 7-13). As with the previous memo,
the conclusions was that all the techniques
were legal so long as they were monitored to
prevent serious threats to the safety of the
detainees (45).
3. Shifting responsibility down the chain of
command
The scandal regarding the treatment of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib required, to a much
greater extent than any other aspect of the
Bush administration’s detainee policy, a
public response and the punishment of the
parties responsible. At first the entirety of
the blame was laid squarely at the feet of the
individual soldiers who had personally committed the abuses seen in the publicly available photographs. Later on, public reports
and investigations forced some top officials
to take some responsibility, at least verbally;
as noted above, no one higher-ranking than a
non-commissioned officer was ever convicted in a court of law for the Abu Ghraib
abuses, and no one at the White House or the
Pentagon was fired or forced to resign immediately.

SUNY Geneseo

In May 2004, shortly after the photographs of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib
were shown to the public, both Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush attempted to limit the blame to the relatively
few American personnel seen in them. In a
press briefing, Rumsfeld decried the actions
of those people and referred to their actions
as “exceptional and isolated” (DefenseLink).
Rumsfeld stated that he took responsibility
for what had happened in Abu Ghraib during
Congressional hearings a few days later, but
considering that he did not resign and was
not investigated his words seem to have little
meaning (Shanker).
President Bush went on Arab television
in early May to claim that he was appalled
by the scandal, that it would be thoroughly
investigated, and that all responsible would
be brought to justice (Stevenson). On 24
May Bush called the abuses the actions of “a
few” soldiers in an address that was televised in the United States (Roth and Worden
146).
The investigations which followed were
damning to upper-level military and civilian
leaders, but not to the point where any sort
of punishment was recommended or implemented. One panel, which was led by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger
and appointed by Rumsfeld to investigate
the scandal, released a report in August 2004
which blamed failures of leadership on the
part of top officials at Central Command and
the Pentagon for creating a climate and culture that was conducive to allowing abuses.
It also accused them of having missed several warning signs about what was happening at Abu Ghraib. However, it also held
that the scenes in the photographs were not
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the result of direct orders and were
merely excesses of the prison “night
shift” out of control. Critically, the
panel did not recommend that Secretary
Rumsfeld or any other senior civilian or
military leader resign or face some other
punishment (Watson). Other internal military investigations came to similar conclusions; that general policy errors had contributed to what had happened in Abu Ghraib,
but that top policy makers should not be
held accountable the way the actual guards
were. In spite of the involvement of Central
Intelligence Agency interrogators at Abu
Ghraib and their actions toward detainees
there, no one recommended investigating
CIA leaders (Roth and Worden 153).
V. Refuting the Bush administration’s arguments
1. Why international law is applicable
a. Reasons why Geneva should be applied to
Afghanistan
The argument that Afghanistan was a
failed state, that the Taliban was therefore
not its legitimate government, and that it
therefore was not a State Party to the Geneva
Conventions, might have been valid had it
been consistent with the practice of the
United States and other countries. In fact,
however, although the Taliban had not been
recognized as the de jure leaders of Afghanistan the international community, including
the United States, had treated it as having
obligations under Afghanistan’s treaties, including the Geneva Conventions, as then
Secretary of State Powell stated in a memo
to Alberto Gonzales advocating the application of international humanitarian law in Afghanistan (Greenberg 124). In fact, the term
“failed state” carries no weight in interna-
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tional law, and Afghanistan’s legal rights
remained intact even through years of divisive warfare (de Nevers 385). The decision
to treat Afghanistan as a failed state unable
to live up to its treaty obligations was therefore not a reasoned decision based on the
facts, but rather a loophole that the administration tried to use in order to carry out its
favored detention policies with less resistance from the international community.
Legal advisers from the Department of
State agreed with Powell that the Geneva
Conventions should have been applied in
Afghanistan. The United States had always
recognized them whenever it brought its
forces into conflicts in the past, which was a
legacy the DOS was reluctant to break with.
The UN Security Council had called on all
parties to the conflict in Afghanistan to adhere to humanitarian law in a resolution
from 1998, and not recognizing the application of those laws would be inconsistent on
the part of the United States. Furthermore,
the DOS legal department held that it would
not be possible to apply the Conventions to
the Taliban but not to Al Qaeda; either everyone involved in the Afghanistan conflict
was protected by law, or none of them were
(Greenberg 129).
Other individuals and organizations, including the ICRC and the Secretary General
of the United Nations, have also criticized
the rationale for not applying the Geneva
Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan.
They have argued that any prisoner must
automatically be treated as a POW unless
and until a court removes any doubt that he
or she does not qualify for such protections.
These critics have also argued that Taliban
soldiers qualify as members of military
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forces loyal to “an authority not
recognized by a the Detaining
Power” as described under Article 4
(a)(3) of GC III. Such fighters would
thus need to be treated as prisoners-ofwar regardless of their obedience to the
laws and customs of war as described in 4
(a)(2) (Greenberg 587).
b. Need for competent tribunals
The legal argument that the President of
the United States can decide that all members of a fighting militia fail to meet the requirements of GC III Article 4 (2) is weak
for a number of reasons. It ignores the possibility, however remote, that any units or
individual members of that militia might
meet the requirements for prisoner of war
status in spite of general trends within the
organization towards noncompliance. Also,
giving the executive branch the power to
unilaterally decide that thousands of fighters
are, essentially, in violation of the laws and
customs of war, circumvents traditional standards of due process for accusations of
criminal behavior. Classifying thousands of
people as criminals, or even alleged criminals, without the involvement of a single
impartial judge violates the need for fairness
in legal proceedings required by international humanitarian and human rights law;
an independent court is needed to ensure that
justice is carried out correctly, even when
dealing with potential war criminals captured on the battlefield.
Even accepting for the sake of argument
that every single member of an armed militia
can be classified as a war criminal at once,
the need for tribunals to hear the cases of
captured prisoners would still not be eliminated. Even without legal doubt that any
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member of a certain organization fails to
meet the legal standards required by GC III,
doubt may still remain whether a given individual is, in fact, a member of said organization. It has been shown that civilians were
arrested by United States military and intelligence personnel in Afghanistan and Pakistan
under the mistaken assumption that they
were members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda,
and that many of them were imprisoned either in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay for
months or years afterward. These errors
would almost certainly have been reduced in
frequency and duration if tribunals had existed to swiftly review the cases of detainees
claiming to have been wrongly arrested.
c. AP I Minimum Standards
The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions has not been ratified by
the United States; however, Article 75,
which guarantees certain rights for prisoners
involved in armed conflicts regardless of
their status, is widely regarded as having
entered or become customary international
law regarding this matter (Sands 150). John
Yoo dismissed the importance of customary
international law in his January 2002 memo,
however, thereby attempting to negate AP I
and other elements of the Geneva Conventions that may have entered into custom.
It is true that customary law is not approved by the United States Congress; however, that does not mean that it should be
ignored so flippantly. That would overlook
the historical and continued importance of
custom to the development of international
and domestic law throughout the world. Declaring that it has no power and can be
safely ignored is disingenuous and selfserving. Moreover, it overlooks the fact
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that United States courts have accepted the validity of customary international law regarding torture and
degrading treatment (Greenberg 600),
d. Human Rights Treaties
The prohibitions against torture in the
ICCPR and the Convention against Torture
apply wherever the States Party to them
have jurisdiction. The CAT specifically requires its prohibitions against torture and
degrading treatment to be a part of the rules
and duties of any government officials of a
State Party involved in the detention or interrogation of prisoners anywhere in the
world. The UN Committee against Torture
has found that several methods used by
American interrogators constitute torture or
degrading treatment under the terms of the
CAT, including frequent beating, excessive
binding of limbs, exposure to low temperatures, long periods of sleep deprivation, and
sensory bombardment (Greenberg 568).
More specifically, the Committee against
Torture found that the patterns of physical
abuse and indefinite detention of prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay violated the Convention
and called on the United States to close the
prison (McCoy 219).
The prohibitions against torture and degrading treatment found in Article 7 of the
ICCPR are absolute and do not countenance
any exceptions for national security or any
other purpose. The Human Rights Committee has found in the past that methods including sleep deprivation, hooding, and others that have been used by American forces
violate Article 7 regardless of how or why
they are used (Greenberg 592),
2. Why some techniques used by the U.S. are
torture
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Jay Bybee’s August 2002 memo went
very far in asserting that the term “torture”
could be legally applied only to an extremely narrow set of practices and that
forms of interrogation that might be considered objectionable were legal under domestic and international law. The memo was
fought by certain Justice Department lawyers, generated a powerful backlash from
legal experts after it became publicly available, and was also inconsistent with the
practices of the United States regarding interrogation methods in foreign countries.
It’s definition of “torture” has been rejected,
and many lawyers, politicians, and NGOs
have since applied that word to American
practices.
a. Legal arguments
After its public release the arguments of
the Bybee memo were roundly criticized by
legal experts. For example, in testimony
given before the Senate Judiciary Committee
in January 2005, the Dean of Yale Law
School Harold Koh called the opinion
“clearly erroneous.” He stated that the narrow definition of “torture” contained within
it contradicted the ordinary and commonly
understood meaning of the word, and that it
would exclude many of the heinous actions
carried out by Saddam Hussein’s security
forces. Dean Koh also argued that the
memo’s interpretation of the Convention
Against Torture to legally permit the use of
cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment
risked giving officials working for the executive branch license to abuse people in
their custody.
Even lawyers who were working at the
Justice Department objected to the reasoning
of the Bybee memo. Jack Goldsmith, who
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became the head of the Office of
Legal Counsel in October 2003, decided that this torture and interrogation policy was legally problematic
shortly afterward. He worked with
other OLC lawyers to have that policy
overturned and the opinion withdrawn –
which had almost never happened over the
course of a single administration before –
until he resigned in July 2004 (Klaidman).
The OLC prepared a new opinion to replace
the Bybee memo which was officially released in December 2004; this new opinion
contained less restrictive definitions of
“torture” and “physical and mental suffering” (Levin).
b. U.S. government practices
The Department of State issues an annual
report on the state of human rights practices
in every other country throughout the world.
It is generally written without undue partisan
political input, and the 2003 report condemned as torture the use of interrogation
methods in foreign countries. Unfortunately,
the United States itself had been using these
techniques against suspected terrorists held
in its custody.
The types of techniques used by the
United States which the State Department
criticized foreign countries for using include,
but are not limited to, stress positions, exposure to extreme temperatures, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding (Roth and Worden
143). Now, it would certainly be possible to
make a serious argument that some of those
methods are not, depending on how they are
used, severe enough to constitute torture; the
State Department isn’t an absolute authority
on such things, after all. However, that the
DOS was willing to criticize these methods
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so strongly in an official, publicly available
document means that these methods are legally and morally objectionable, at least to
the point where they rise to the level of
cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment.
Even saying for the sake of argument that
the State Department is in the wrong and
that some of the above techniques do not rise
to the level of torture does not make them
acceptable. The use of such techniques by
anyone, regardless of their exact legal classifications, should never be tolerated.
c. Severity of techniques
There are, on the other hand, certain interrogation methods which unquestionably
constitute torture according to the plain
meaning of the world, the definition found
in the ICCPR and the Convention against
Torture, and even by the unreasonably severe definitions of the Bybee memo. International human rights organizations have
unequivocally denounced them, and their
victims have been left with permanent physical injuries and disabilities, as well as dangerous and long-lasting mental illnesses as a
result of their treatment.
Several prisoners held at Guantanamo
were driven to suicidal behavior by the conditions of fear, uncertainty, and constant
abuse at the prison camp. During the first
eighteen months of the camp’s operation
there were twenty-eight officially recognized
suicide attempts and over three hundred instances of prisoners acting in a self-abusive
manner. A mass suicide attempt in 2003
involving twenty-three prisoners led to only
two attempts being officially reported, while
the others were classified as merely “selfinjurious.” It seems that the use of that classification in Guantanamo should be
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with some suspicion (Worthington
Guantanamo Files 271). Less severe instances of mental illness have
also been disproportionately common
among the Guantanamo prisoners, as a
group of British citizens released in 2004
reported that a fifth of the prisoners were
taking anti-depressant medications and approximately a hundred had other clearly visible forms of mental illness (280).
Interrogations and abuse by American
personnel in Iraq have also been known to
cause severe mental and physical harm. Red
Cross doctors that were part of the delegation visiting Abu Ghraib concluded that certain prisoners they interviewed at the prison
displayed signs of mental illness including
memory loss, anxiety, problems speaking or
the inability to speak, and suicidal tendencies as a result of their interrogations by MI
personnel (Greenberg 393). Official United
States military documents that had been suppressed but later released also revealed that
several Iraqi prisoners died while in custody
at Abu Ghraib and secret CIA facilities; a
dozen of these deaths were ruled either
homicides or “unexplained” on death certificates. For example, an Iraqi air force general
who surrendered to American troops in November 2003 died several days later as a result of beatings from CIA and MI interrogators at a makeshift facility in the desert
(McCoy 144).
The “enhanced interrogation techniques”
used by the CIA at its secret locations have
come under particularly harsh criticism by
humanitarian organizations throughout the
world, as most of them clearly constitute
torture or extremely cruel and degrading
treatment. A leaked internal document from
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the International Committee of the Red
Cross, for example, labeled these techniques
“torture” based on interviews with prisoners
who had experienced them. Many prisoners
reported that stress positions and forced
standing were the most physically painful
methods (Shane, “Book Cites Secret Red
Cross Report”). Severe sleep deprivation
also qualifies as one of the approved
“enhanced” methods that unquestionably
qualifies as torture; the late Menachim Begin, who experienced such methods while he
lived in the Soviet Union, even wrote that
the desire for uninterrupted sleep can feel
even worse than hunger or thirst (Conroy
34).
One method that has been the particular
focus of controversy and debate is
“waterboarding,” the “enhanced technique”
that has been used on the smallest number of
prisoners and arguably the most severe.
“Waterboarding” can refer to variety of
means for cutting off the victim’s air supply
with water, all of which produce physical
and mental sensations similar to drowning.
The question of whether waterboarding constitutes torture has been in the national consciousness ever since its use on prisoners
suspected of being high-ranking Al Qaeda
members was first revealed; the past three
Attorney Generals of the United States have
been asked at their Senate confirmation
hearings whether they believe the technique
is illegal torture. Neither Alberto Gonzales
nor Robert Mukasey were willing to categorically and unequivocally answer the
question, which is disconcerting when one
considers the painful and debilitating nature
of the technique.
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Waterboarding is undoubtedly torture, by any standard, even Jay Bybee’s “death or organ failure” criteria,
because of the extremely painful and
terrifying feelings it elicits and because
it does indeed feel very similar to death
by drowning. It has been known to cause
long-lasting psychological damage14 resulting in years of anxiety and panic attacks,
thus fulfilling even the strict criteria for
“mental suffering” found in the Bybee
memo. American courts have even convicted Japanese soldiers of war crimes because they waterboarded prisoners during
the Second World War (Amnesty International).
Other legal experts also consider it torture. Daniel Levin, for example, served as
an Assistant Attorney General in 2004 and
wrote the more moderate legal opinion on
the legality of interrogation methods which
replaced the Bybee memo. After volunteering to undergo waterboarding personally, he
concluded that it would constitute torture
unless done in a very restricted way, and that
the Bush administration had not provided
effective protocols for its application. Levin
was fired, perhaps unsurprisingly, after Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General
(Greenburg and de Vogue). The current Attorney General of the United States, Eric
Holder, declared unequivocally that waterboarding is torture during his own Senate
confirmation hearing, an indication of a fortunate reversal in interrogation policies from
the Bush administration (Montanaro).
3. Why abuse was systemic and a result of
top-down authorization
From all the abuses that have been described above it should be fairly clear that
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torture carried out by American personnel is
far more wide-ranging than the mere presence of a few poorly supervised “bad apples” could account for. The memos and
orders regarding the lack of Geneva Convention rights for detainees, the authorization of
indefinite detention and extreme methods of
coercive interrogation, and legal justifications for permitting acts of torture and degrading treatment all draw a line of causality
and responsibility between decisions made
in the White House and mistreatment of
prisoners throughout the world.
Because torture has been universally regarded as morally abhorrent for the past few
hundred years, orders to commit it in the recent past have often been couched in euphemisms and permissive messages instead of
plain language. Official declarations from
top American civilian and military leaders,
including the application of the term “enemy
combatants” by President Bush and statements from military leaders calling detainees
“very dangerous” or “like dogs” served to
dehumanize them and sent signals that inhumane treatment for them would be acceptable (Roth and Worden 162-164). The
President, the Secretary of Defense, or other
leaders may not have given direct orders to,
for example, the “night shift” at Abu Ghraib
to beat, threaten, and humiliate the prisoners
there, but their actions and words did create
a tolerant environment that allowed them
and many of their fellow service members
throughout the world to consider such behavior acceptable. They are responsible, at
the very least, for not doing nearly enough to
prevent these abuses, and possibly for the
deliberate creation of a pro-torture atmosphere (170).
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There are also cases of torture and
inhumane treatment by Americans
that were approved and ordered by
high-ranking American officials, like
the aforementioned “take the gloves
off” authorization from Rumsfeld to John
Walker Lindh’s interrogators (165). He
also personally signed off on the use of
stress positions and forced nudity on detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Greenberg 237).
Waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress
positions were legally validated for use on
Abu Zubaydah by an official Justice Department opinion of which White House and
CIA leaders were undoubtedly aware (Bybee
18). The specifics of the CIA’s “enhanced”
methods were chosen and initially approved
by select members of the National Security
Council, including Vice President Cheney,
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and National Security Advisor Rice. Further requests for permission to use the techniques
in specific cases were consistently approved
by this group (Greenburg, Rosenberg and de
Vogue).
Prisoner abuse occurred in every theater
of operations where the “War on Terror”
was waged, and not because of a small number of soldiers who didn’t know any better.
The most senior Bush administration leaders
specifically condoned the use of illegal
methods in several cases and fostered an atmosphere of disrespect for the rule of law
and the human dignity of detainees that led
to many other abuses.
VI. Why Enforcing and Respecting International Law is in the Best Interest of the
United States
Obeying international law isn’t a pointless endeavor which restricts our actions

without generating any benefits. On the
contrary, adhering to the law would increase
the standing of the United States throughout
the world, discredit our enemies, protect our
soldiers, and convince people all over the
world to be more cooperative.
1. Comparative Analysis
In discussing the effects of indefinite detention, torture, and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment on a state’s ability to fight
a war, especially one with a heavy focus on
counterinsurgency operations, it will be useful to briefly examine twp other cases of torture sponsored by democratic states in similar situations. They are: first, the arrest of
hundreds of Northern Irish Catholics and
experimental torture of about fourteen of
them by the United Kingdom in 1971; and
second, the time from 1987-1999 where Israeli security forces were legally allowed to
use limited levels of coercive interrogation
techniques against Palestinian detainees.
a. The United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland, 1971
In the early 1970s the violent unrest
among Catholics in Northern Ireland was
rapidly escalating, and the British government felt that it had to take drastic measures
to prevent further deterioration, starting with
“internment,” indefinite detention with no
need for evidence or courts. Hundreds of
Catholics suspected of membership or sympathy with the Irish Republican Army were
rounded up and “interned” in August 1971
(Conroy 4). The operation was poorly implemented, and several internees were arrested because of outdated intelligence or
mistaken identity. Beatings with clubs were
standard for all the internees (Melaugh).
Fourteen men were taken from the regular
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prison camps to secret locations
where a course of experimental coercive interrogation techniques focusing on sensory deprivation15was applied
to them over the course of eight days.
The men were forced to stand against
a wall in a painfully uncomfortable position
while hooded, beaten severely whenever
they collapsed from this standing position,
exposed to cold temperatures, deprived of
sufficient amounts of food and sleep, and
subjected to overwhelming sound recordings
that prevented anything else from being
heard. After the end of this ordeal the prisoners were moved back to the regular internment camps (McGuffin 57-60). During the
course of these abuses many men suffered
from both visual and audio hallucinations
such as music, religious sermons, and fantasies of escape and suicide (73). In 1978 the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that
the five techniques did not rise to the level
of torture but did constitute inhuman, degrading, and illegal treatment, contrary to
the opinion of the Republic of Ireland and
Amnesty International. No British soldiers
or officials were prosecuted for their roles in
the affair (Conroy 187).
Rather than improving the security situation in Ireland, the internment and torture
caused a marked downturn. Nonviolent
Irish nationalists refused to participate in
Northern Ireland’s government out of protest, and Catholics gave more support to the
Irish Republican Army, which stepped up its
own level of violent action (Melaugh).
The parallels with the United States are
striking. In both cases, a government resorted to extreme, extralegal and illegal
methods of imprisonment and interrogation
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in order to eliminate a threat posed by a terrorist group. Also in both cases, the “tough”
methods did relatively little to impede the
actual extremists and instead hurt mostly
innocent people, infuriating local populations and encouraging them to support the
terrorists’ cause.
b. Israel during the Landau Commission era,
1987-1999
Israel has had well-known, chronic problems with its military and security forces
mistreating Palestinian civilians for years,
even up to the present day (B’Tselem
“Absolute Prohibition”). The problem of
torture being used on prisoners was especially acute, however, during a twelve-year
period when coercive interrogation methods
were formally legalized.
After a pair of scandals concerning the
lack of transparency and use of violence in
Israel’s security forces, a commission
headed by Justice Moshe Landau was appointed to investigate the matter. The Landau Commission concluded in 1987 that the
security forces should be provided with legal
guidelines for the use of a “moderate”
amount of force during interrogations, so
that they could be effective without having
to hide their actions from public scrutiny
(Conroy 213). The Commission’s proposal
attempted to limit both the intensity of coercive methods used through official regulations and the number of suspects to which
they could be applied by limiting their use
only to prisoners who had knowledge of imminent attacks (the “ticking time bomb” scenario) on civilians. Both attempts failed
completely
The methods used by the Israelis routinely exceed the limits set in the Landau
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Commission’s guidelines rose to
the level of torture, and included
sleep deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures, stress positions,
sensory bombardment, and violent
shaking. At least one Palestinian prisoner
died from being shaken too much (Roth and
Worden 36-37). Security forces also arrested, harassed, and abused the wives of
men being interrogated in order to force out
confessions of wrongdoing or otherwise
pressure the husbands (B’Tselem “Detention
and Interrogation”). The security services
also claimed far too many cases of detainees
having vital information necessitating coercion. Activists, religious leaders, Islamic
charity workers, and others – nearly every
Palestinian interrogated by Israel during this
time – was tortured by Israeli security during
this time period, justified by the specter of
the “ticking time bomb” (Roth and Worden
40). The Israeli justice system did not check
these abuses until the High Court of Justice
banned all the coercive techniques of the
security services for violating domestic and
international law in 1999.
The possibility of torture being legally
allowable in a limited fashion is shown false
by Israel’s example. Without absolute legal
and ethical prohibitions against torture, the
torturers become desensitized to it and practice it routinely. As in the United States,
allowing limited amounts of violent coercion, even with guidelines and requirements
for authorization, caused a culture of abuse
to spread throughout the system, leading to
widespread violations of international law
(41-42).
2. The importance of Geneva Convention
protections for American soldiers
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Many military and legal experts have
called upon the United States government to
respect the Geneva Conventions, not out of
love for esoteric, abstract legal principles,
but for the simple fact that the Conventions
make our troops safer. International humanitarian law often protects American soldiers when they are captured, and even when
we are faced with enemies that do not respect the law they should not be allowed to
bring us to their level. By placing conflicts
in which we participate under the auspices
of the Geneva Conventions and following
the law we would make it easier to bring justice to those who would abuse captured
Americans. Treating our enemies better than
they treat us demonstrates American integrity, improves our moral standing, and
makes it more likely that others will follow
our example in the future (De Nevers 387).
John Hutson, who is the President of the
Franklin Pierce Law Center and a former
admiral of the United States Navy, articulated very clearly in Congressional hearings
the importance of the Geneva Conventions
to the safety of American troops. He argued
that war needs to be conducted in a way that
will allow for peace, that the Geneva Conventions lay out a way to accomplish that
goal, and that only by complying with those
laws itself will the United State be able to
compel others to follow them too. The primary concern of all the U.S. policymakers
who adhered to GC III after 1949 was the
well-being of Americans, and by deriding its
requirements we would be removing safeguards from our soldiers and rejecting the
community of nations. Admiral Hutson
points out that, as the United States has more
soldiers deployed abroad than every other
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nation in the world combined, we
should rightfully be the most concerned about maintaining the integrity
of international humanitarian law
(Hutson).
No less an expert on prisoner of war
abuse than Senator John McCain has also
called on the American people to respect
international law in the wake of the Abu
Ghraib scandal. Cautioning against the view
that the ICRC were mere “do-gooders” and
that obeying the law hinders our soldiers,
Senator McCain argued that the Red Cross
and the Geneva Conventions protect our soldiers, and that those who committed abuses
increased the danger for American troops in
this and future wars by undermining those
safeguards. He also asserted that the United
States should seek to maintain its integrity
and standing as a nation governed by the
rule of law which meets universal standards
of fair treatment towards prisoners
(McCain).
Military veterans and legal experts alike
believe that international humanitarian law
is vital to the well-being of American soldiers abroad. Those who sacrifice to protect
us need and deserve the protections of the
Geneva Conventions.
3. The ineffectiveness of coercive interrogation
The reasoning behind the acceptance of
violent, coercive interrogation methods
amounting to cruel, humiliating, inhuman
treatment or torture relies on necessity and
expediency. Such methods may be thought
necessary in order to obtain vital, life-saving
information from recalcitrant terrorists, or at
least to obtain it quickly enough to prevent
an attack or effectively disrupt a terrorist
network. While this dilemma between com-
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mitting universally reviled acts of brutality
and possibly allowing thousands of civilians
to be killed poses an interesting philosophical question, in actual practice no such dilemma exists. There is no evidence that violently coercive interrogation yields accurate
information, whereas there is much evidence
that legal, non-violent techniques have produced good results even when used against
modern terrorists.
A study of the effectiveness of interrogation methods was published by the Center
for Strategic Intelligence Research in December 2006. This study crucially found
that there was no rigorous research on
whether coercive interrogation methods used
in the fashion that American personnel had
been applying them were effective, but that
the majority of anecdotal information suggested that such techniques were not effective. It specifically concluded that the application of pain to an uncooperative interrogation subject would be more likely to reduce
compliance than increase it, and that the use
of stress-inducing methods impair the cognitive functions of the brain of those subjected
to them, thus potentially reducing the accuracy of subsequently acquired information
(Fein 35).
Academic researchers are not the only
ones who have claimed that torture does not
reliably yield accurate information; American military interrogators who have operated
on both fronts hold the same opinion. One
MI officer who served in Afghanistan, for
example, wrote that degradation such as
what took place in Abu Ghraib does not facilitate intelligence gathering, and that all
the successes he and his unit achieved were
accomplished without threats,
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beatings, or humiliation (Mackey
xxv).
Colonel Steven Kleinman, an intelligence and interrogation specialist of
the United States Air Force, denounced
the coercive interrogation as ineffective
while testifying before Congress. He argued that the perceived effectiveness of such
techniques skewed the public debate over
torture and that extreme physical or emotional stress should not be viewed as necessary for gathering information or appropriate
for punishing terrorists. He stressed that
properly conducted interrogations induce
cooperation between prisoners and interrogators, whereas coercive methods can only
force compliance from a prisoner; communist interrogators often forced confessions of
war crimes from American prisoners-of-war
during the Korean and Vietnam wars, for
example, but these were mostly false and
therefore useless from an intelligence standpoint. Colonel Kleinman also noted, much
like the aforementioned CSIR study, the
“natural fragility of memory,” and that coercive methods would not only make it more
likely for prisoners to be unable to recall
specific information, but also for them to
unintentionally give out misinformation. He
concluded that coercive interrogation fails to
extract information from prisoners fully or
accurately.
The specific methods chosen as the
CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” repertoire
do not have a history of eliciting accurate
information. They were based on methods
that some members of the United States
militarily voluntarily undergo in a limited
fashion during Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (or SERE) training
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courses. The reason these personnel are
trained to resist the SERE techniques is that
they were used against American POWs by
the Chinese during the Korean War, a fact
that high-level government officials who
approved the enhanced interrogation methods were unaware of. The Chinese used
them mostly to extract false confessions of
war crimes; a study of their effects published
in 1956 stated that the Chinese methods led
to suggestibility and memory loss, not truth
(Shane and Mazzetti). The SERE methods
which became the “enhanced interrogation
techniques” are more useful for making people say what they are supposed to say than
they are for acquiring accurate intelligence.
Debates are ongoing as to what information exactly has been gained from using coercive interrogation methods on Al Qaeda
members. Mohammed al-Qahtani, who was
tortured at Guantanamo Bay, accused many
other prisoners there of affiliation with Al
Qaeda during his interrogations only to recant, claiming he had lied to stop his suffering (Zagorin). It is unclear exactly what intelligence was extracted from KSM and
Zubaydah during the time when they were
subjected to waterboarding. Former CIA
officials and Bush administration leaders
have claimed that the use of the technique
led to the acquisition of vital intelligence,
whereas others (such as FBI Director Robert
Mueller) have claimed that coercive interrogations did not yield intelligence that directly prevented a terrorist attack. There are
conflicting reports about when and under
what circumstances Zubaydah and KSM revealed information (Shane “Interrogations’
Effectiveness May Prove Elusive”). Even if
these torturous methods had been necessary
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to acquire the information these Al
Qaeda leaders gave up, the high cost
of using them16 probably negated the
benefits of it. In all likelihood, however, all the intelligence gained from
the high value Al Qaeda detainees probably could have been elicited through legal,
non-coercive methods.
The effectiveness of nonviolent interrogation methods has been borne out not just
historically, but even during the current war
against terrorists in Iraq. Following the media exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, military interrogators deliberately set out to use
different methods, ones that wouldn’t debase
or degrade prisoners and shock the consciences of American citizens. These techniques involved respecting prisoners, their
circumstances and their beliefs, establishing
connections and incentives for cooperation,
and compliance with the standards set by
GC III (Alexander “How to Break a Terrorist” 6).
Treating prisoners humanely lead to significant intelligence coups in Iraq, where
obtaining information about the operations
and command structure of Al Qaeda in
Mesopotamia was of paramount importance
in preventing suicide bomb attacks and other
disruptive, violent attacks. By establishing
relationships with prisoners and offering
them (often false) hopes for solving the
problems that had driven them to violence in
the first place, military interrogators were
able to extract vital details about safe houses
and relationships between important figures
(136). On at least one occasion a prisoner
offered an explanation for why and how he
had been mistakenly arrested, and the interrogators made an effort to verify his story
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instead of continuing to assume he was lying, the sort of effort that would have kept a
lot of innocent people of Guantanamo Bay if
it had been consistently applied by American
personnel in Afghanistan earlier in the war
(166).
4. Effect torture and indefinite detentions
have had had on international perceptions
of the United States
The standing of the United States as a
leader in morality, ethics, and upholding the
rule of law has suffered tremendously because of the Bush administration’s illegal
policies. Negative reactions to indefinite
detention and torture have been especially
strong among Middle Eastern Muslims;
many of them have been convinced to join
extremist organizations and fight against the
United States because of these policies.
Global perceptions of the United States
declined significantly during the Bush administration, especially among predominantly Muslim countries but in Europe as
well. How much of that is because of
American policies regarding detainees
would be difficult to pin down exactly, with
other factors such as support for Israel or the
unilateral invasion of and continued American presence in Iraq contributing as well.
Regardless, positive views of the United
States declined in over two-thirds of the
countries where data was available (Pew
Global Attitudes Project).
Images of the prison at Guantanamo Bay
and its orange-suited inmates have become
iconic in predominately Muslim countries.
Stories of disrespect, abuse, and torture have
spread through the media and the personal
accounts of those who have been released
and returned to their homes. The sexual
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humiliation and abuse of detainees,
as well as stories of American soldiers demeaning the religious traditions of Muslims, such as beards and
the sacredness of the Quran, have
strengthened the idea that the war against
terrorism is just a front or disguise for a war
on Islam itself (Sengupta). This is important
because research has shown that Muslims
who believe that the United States is waging
a war on Islam are more likely to support
violence against American soldiers and civilians (Weber 1).
The severe worsening of violent attacks
in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 after the Abu
Ghraib scandal bears this out. One veteran
went so far as to blame half the casualties in
Iraq on fighters who joined terrorist groups
because of America’s torture policies, and
that those policies led to the deaths of about
as many people killed in the September 11th
terrorist attacks (Alexander “I’m Still Tortured”).
VII. Conclusions
The illegal and counterproductive methods of the past must be completely eliminated in order for there to be a chance for the
United States to restore its reputation, repair
the damage done to our ability to lead, and
prevent lawlessness from taking over the
country. The Geneva Conventions should
be applied to the all military operations
against terrorists, and all military operations
of the future in general, as both a matter of
policy and law. Torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, and any other sort of
coercive interrogation method must be
banned absolutely for all U.S. personnel,
who should be required to use nonviolent
interrogation techniques instead. The Guan-
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tanamo Bay prison and the black sites
should be closed, and all prisoners either
treated as prisoners of war as GC III demands, charged as criminals in a normal
American court or released. Those responsible for torture should be investigated and
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
Fortunately, many of these policies are
already being carried out by the new President of the United States, Barack Obama.
He has ordered the closing of the CIA black
sites, banned waterboarding and other torture methods, and ordered the prison at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base closed and the
prisoners’ files re-reviewed, a process which
reportedly will take about a year.
Unfortunately, the new policies aren’t
perfect. Obama’s Justice Department has
continued to try to deny prisoners at Bagram
Air Force Base in Afghanistan the right to
challenge their detentions (Savage). President Obama has also stated that he doesn’t
want the government to investigate people
responsible for torture as the CAT requires it
to, although Congressional Democrats may
press on with that issue regardless. Additionally, there will probably be difficulties
finding places to put many of the released
prisoners from Guantanamo. The case of the
Uighur prisoners, who face difficulties finding new homes because of pressure from the
Chinese, is probably the most extreme case
of such problems (Spiegel and Demick). Despite this, the new administration represents
a real possibility for redemption from this
sordid affair.
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3

See discussion of universal jurisdiction, below.
4

Ibid.

1

International law can also come from
custom, which is based on traditions of
state practice. It is the oldest form of international law, but it can be hard to define
where customary law exists and exactly
what its provisions are (Shaw 69). Treaties
may codify or reflect preexisting customary
law, of course, and it is possible for treaty
provisions to create customary law, depending on how widely adopted they are and
other considerations (Shaw 90).

5

The “exhaustion of domestic remedies rule”
flows from the legal principle of state sovereignty; most human rights treaties explicitly
include it as a provision (Shaw 254).
6

The current Special Rapporteur for torture
is Manfred Nowak, an Austrian lawyer specializing in human rights, according to his
official biography on the OHCHR website.
7

2

Article 130 of GC III defines grave
breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, compelling
a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular
trial prescribed in this Convention.” And
Article 147 of GC IV defines them as
“wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments, wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person
to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or
wilfully depriving a protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in
the present Convention, taking of hostages
and extensive destruction and appropriation
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions, obviously,
did not operate during the war. However,
the 1929 Geneva Convention afforded a
largely similar set of rights to prisoners of
war; that particular Convention definitely
bound the German government, and the
Japanese government made an agreement
with the Allies near the opening of hostilities
to observe the Convention. A majority of
judges at the Tokyo trial later decided this
agreement was legally binding on Japan
(Boister 184).
8

The Trial of Major War Criminals in Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo both included prisoner of war abuse among the war
crimes with which they charged the leaders
of Germany and Japan (North) (Boister
196). Other trials which followed focused
on lower-ranking war criminals and also included alleged POW abusers from both Germany and Japan (Truman Library) (Kerr
296).
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9

The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal established the
rules and procedure for the Nuremberg Trials, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East did the same for the Tokyo Trials.
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ture found that psychological problems were
significantly higher among victims who had
experienced a mock execution (Conroy 180).
15

Specifically, a combination of sleep deprivation, starvation, forced standing, hooding,
and bombardment with white noise, later
10
Specifically, Article 42 of GC IV and Arti- referred to as “the five techniques” (Conroy
cle 75, paragraph 3 of AP I state that pro- 6).
tected persons must not be held for longer
than is necessary, and Article 9, paragraph 3 16See section on international perception of
states that anyone who is arrested with the United States, below.
criminal charges must be brought before a
judge and given a trial within a reasonable
time frame
11

Hamdan was sentenced to five and half
years of imprisonment, with time already
spent in Guantanamo Bay counting toward
it; his sentence will be up in January 2009.
12

This was part of a general pattern of attacking men who practiced Islam by targeting their religious beliefs. In addition to the
aforementioned invasion of space by females and forced shaving of facial hair, the
ICRC also gathered credible testimony from
detainees at Guantanamo indicating that
guards had physically disrespected the
Quran, the holy book of Islam (Labott).
13

It was in the discussion of the positives of
ignoring Geneva that Gonzales made the infamous comment about the nature of the war
on terror making parts of GC III “obsolete”
and “quaint.”
14

Because it simulates death by drowning,
waterboarding is arguably a form of mock
execution. One study of the effects of tor-
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